Three essays on corruption and auctions by PAPIOTI, Katerina Chara
  
Three Essays on Corruption and Auctions 
 
Katerina Chara Papioti 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree 
of Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Florence, December 2014 

 
European University Institute 
Department of Economics 
Three Essays on Corruption and Auctions  
Katerina Chara Papioti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of 
Economics of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Prof. Massimo Morelli, Bocconi University, Supervisor 
Prof. Andrea Mattozzi, EUI  
Prof. Marco Celentani, Universidad Carlos III 
Prof. Matthias Dahm, University of Nottingham 
 
© Papioti, 2014 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
 
 
Abstract
This thesis contributes to the understanding of corruption and auctions. It consists
of three chapters focusing on diverse aspects of these two general topics as well as
their combinations, from an applied microeconomic theory perspective: (i) the ef-
fects of corruption on bidding behaviour in all-pay auctions and the auctioneer’s
decisions, (ii) the use of central bank bond auctions as tools to measure banks’
liquidity risk, and (iii) the persistence of corruption and corruption diﬀerences be-
tween similar economies.
As discussed in recent bibliography, auctions performed by an intermediary between
the seller of the good and buyers can be penetrable by corruption. Furthermore,
corruption can enter auctions in diﬀerent forms. In the ﬁrst chapter of this thesis,
entitled Corruption in All-Pay Auctions, we compare the eﬀects of pure pecuniary
corruption and favouritism on bidding behaviour and the auctioneer’s expected rev-
enue, in the context of All-Pay Auctions, used to model lobbying, labour-market
tournaments and competition for monopoly power. We provide conditions under
which favouritism makes bidders more or less aggressive than in the benchmark
model without corruption, and prove that bidders are always more aggressive when
faced with a non favouritist corrupt auctioneer. In both cases, the revenue maxi-
mizing auctioneer deprives his collaborator of all ”surplus” of corruption. Finally,
we study the auctioneer’s choice of corruption type, and ﬁnd that his expected
revenue is not necessarily monotonic in the probability that he choses one type of
corruption or the other.
In the second chapter, entitled Bond Auctions and Financial Sector Liquidity Risk,
a joint work with Gre´gory Claeys, we aim to provide a tool for central banks –
and in particular for the Central Bank of Chile – to measure liquidity risk in their
ﬁnancial sector using the bidding behaviour of banks in bond auctions. First, we
build a model combining the auction literature and the ﬁnancial economics litera-
ture to understand precisely the eﬀect of the liquidity risk aﬀecting banks on their
bidding strategies in those auctions. We develop a benchmark version of the model
with no insurance against the liquidity shock, and another with a lender of last
resort to see how the behavior of the banks is aﬀected by this policy. Based on the
revelation principle characterizing auctions, and using a unique dataset collected at
Central Bank of Chile containing all the details of its open market operation auc-
tions (where it sells bonds to drain money from the banking sector) between 2002
and 2012, we estimate the distribution of the liquidity risk across Chilean banks
and its changes over time. The evolution of the estimated distribution seems to
capture well the main episodes of liquidity stress of the last decade in the Chilean
banking sector. This measuring tool could be used by other central banks con-
ducting similar open market operations and in need of evaluating in real time the
i
evolution of the liquidity risk aﬀecting their ﬁnancial sector.
In the third chapter, entitled Strategic Complementarities and Corruption, we
study an environment where agents compete against each other for the acquisition
of a public good procurement project, assigned by the government and handled by a
possibly corrupt inspector. We ﬁnd that there exists multiplicity of equilibria, and
in speciﬁc both ”good” equilibria without corruption, and ”bad” equilibria where
corruption arises. This is very useful for us to interpret why countries that are
quite similar in all other characteristics, can diﬀer a lot in the level of corruption
in their economy. Our result is consistent with recent bibliography on procure-
ment, however multiplicity of equilibria in our model arises without any particular
assumptions on the preferences of individuals. In our eﬀort to conﬁrm the multiplic-
ity of equilibria also in the repeated game, we ﬁnd that inspectors might consider
it proﬁtable to suﬀer negative payoﬀs in the ﬁrst period of the game, in order to
create more fuzziness as to how much corruption there is in the economy, and thus
decrease the probability of getting caught for everyone, guaranteeing themselves
bigger positive payoﬀs in their last period in the game.
ii
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Preface
This thesis contributes to the understanding of corruption and auctions. It con-
sists of three chapters focusing on diverse aspects of these two general topics as
well as their combinations, from an applied microeconomic theory perspective: (i)
the eﬀects of corruption on bidding behaviour in all-pay auctions and the auc-
tioneer’s decisions, (ii) the use of central bank bond auctions as tools to measure
banks’ liquidity risk, and (iii) the persistence of corruption and corruption diﬀer-
ences between similar economies. The ﬁrst and third chapter of this thesis focus on
corruption and its eﬀects on the economy. The past forty years, policy makers and
academics alike have shown deep interest in understanding corruption, as countries
of every sort- developing, transition countries as well as major economies- have suf-
fered corruption scandals. Most economists accept that corruption can occur where
rents exist, usually as a result of government regulation, however many economic
activities plagued by corruption are yet to be studied, like lobbying and labour
market tournaments. Assessing the mechanism of corruption in All-Pay Auctions,
representing such economic activities is one of the goals of this thesis, along with
examining why corruption is a persistent phenomenon. The second chapter of the
thesis concentrates on liquidity risk as the main determinant of banks’ bidding
strategies in Central Banks’ bond auctions. Recent literature, especially after the
ﬁnancial turmoil starting in 2007 has aimed to provide measures of liquidity risk
mostly based on banks’ balance-sheet data, or market-based data. A third goal of
this thesis is to provide a tool for central banks to measure liquidity risk in their
ﬁnancial sector using the bidding behavior of banks in bond auctions.
As discussed in recent bibliography, auctions performed by an intermediary be-
tween the seller of the good and buyers can be penetrable by corruption. Fur-
thermore, corruption can enter auctions in diﬀerent forms. In the ﬁrst chapter
of this thesis, entitled Corruption in All-Pay Auctions, we compare the eﬀects of
pure pecuniary corruption and favouritism on bidding behaviour and the auction-
eer’s expected revenue, in the context of All-Pay Auctions, used to model lobbying,
labour-market tournaments and competition for monopoly power. We provide con-
ditions under which favouritism makes bidders more or less aggressive than in the
benchmark model without corruption, and prove that bidders are always more ag-
gressive when faced with a non favouritist corrupt auctioneer. In both cases, the
revenue maximizing auctioneer deprives his collaborator of all ”surplus of corrup-
tion”. Finally, we study the auctioneer’s choice of corruption type, and ﬁnd that
his expected revenue is not necessarily monotonic in the probability that he choses
one type of corruption or the other.
In our study of corruption, we chose the sealed bid All-Pay Auction as our main
v
setting; as far as we know there is no literature studying corruption in this setting.
The basic strand of literature focuses on auctions as procurement mechanisms and
consequently uses the First Price Auction. Nevertheless, we deem it important to
study the eﬀects of corruption in All-Pay Auctions for two reasons: they represent
economic procedures that are not immune to corruption, and due to their modeling
particularity can oﬀer insights that First Price Auctions cannot.
When studying pure pecuniary corruption, an interesting result of our paper that
is particular to All-Pay auctions is that, contrary to Second Price Auctions that are
immune to corruption, in the merely theoretical concept of a Second Price All-Pay
Auction this is not the case. This is due to the fact that in a Second Price All-Pay
Auction players do not have a dominant strategy to follow, thus corruption alters
bidding behaviour and bidders become more aggressive than without corruption.
We also discuss the possibility that, within the setting of posterior corruption, the
second highest bidder is approached by the auctioneer. We ﬁnd that in an auction
with only two participants an equilibrium does not exist however, against our orig-
inal intuition, for N > 2 an equilibrium can exist.
In our study of bidding behaviour of agents, we ﬁnd that in the presence of a
favourite bidder, other bidders become more or less aggressive given some condi-
tions on the curvature of the distribution of valuations (analogous condition to
Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009), who study favouritism in First Price Auc-
tions). This in not the case however when the auctioneer is only interested in
maximizing his payoﬀs, when in the presence of corruption bidders always become
more aggressive. However in both settings, the corrupt auctioneer robs bidders oﬀ
all ”surplus” of corruption.
In our paper, we not only consider the two types of corrupt auctioneers separately,
but also attempt a comparison between the two. We ﬁnd that the corrupt auc-
tioneer does not necessarily prefer to be one type or the other with probability 1,
and depending on the dustribution of valuations might chose both with positive
probability.
In the second chapter, entitled Bond Auctions and Financial Sector Liquidity Risk,
a joint work with Gre´gory Claeys, we aim to provide a tool for central banks –
and in particular for the Central Bank of Chile – to measure liquidity risk in their
ﬁnancial sector using the bidding behaviour of banks in bond auctions. First, we
build a model combining the auction literature and the ﬁnancial economics litera-
ture to understand precisely the eﬀect of the liquidity risk aﬀecting banks on their
bidding strategies in those auctions. We develop a benchmark version of the model
with no insurance against the liquidity shock, and another with a lender of last
resort to see how the behavior of the banks is aﬀected by this policy. Based on the
revelation principle characterizing auctions, and using a unique dataset collected at
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Central Bank of Chile containing all the details of its open market operation auc-
tions (where it sells bonds to drain money from the banking sector) between 2002
and 2012, we estimate the distribution of the liquidity risk across Chilean banks
and its changes over time. The evolution of the estimated distribution seems to
capture well the main episodes of liquidity stress of the last decade in the Chilean
banking sector. This measuring tool could be used by other central banks con-
ducting similar open market operations and in need of evaluating in real time the
evolution of the liquidity risk aﬀecting their ﬁnancial sector.
Our model consists of three periods: in the ﬁrst period players (banks) place bids
(rates) in a uniform multi-unit bond auction organized by an institution (central
bank)-that wishes to sell a speciﬁc volume of bonds- given their own probability of
becoming illiquid in the future, which is exogenous and private information. In the
second period the probability materializes and now illiquid players must repay the
creditors that endowed them with their initial wealth. Given that bonds bought
in the ﬁrst period take two periods to mature, illiquid players now make losses. In
the third period proﬁts (or losses) of players are calculated. We study increasing
symmetric equilibria in two settings: one without any insurance for illiquid play-
ers, and one where the institution (central bank) acts as Lender of Last Resort for
illiquid players. We ﬁnd that although the symmetric bids (rates) in the LLR case
are bounded by the LLR pay-back rate, in the no insurance case symmetric bids
become much higher. After having obtained the symmetric bidding functions, we
perform a structural analysis of the Bond Auctions of the Central Bank of Chile.
Using the Kumaraswami distribution, and observed bids from the 30-day bond
(PDBC) auctions from 2002 to 2012, we estimate the liquidity risk distribution of
Chilean Banks; we ﬁnd that the evolution of the estimated distribution captures
well the main episodes of liquidity stress of the last decade in the Chilean banking
sector.
In the third chapter, entitled Strategic Complementarities and Corruption, we
study an environment where agents compete against each other for the acquisition
of a public good procurement project, assigned by the government and handled by
a possibly corrupt inspector. We ﬁnd that there exists multiplicity of equilibria,
and in speciﬁc both ”good” equilibria without corruption, and ”bad” equilibria
where corruption arises. The multiplicity of equilibria arising in our simple one-
shot model is very useful for us to interpret why countries that are quite similar in
all other characteristics, can diﬀer a lot in the level of corruption in their economy,
like Chile and Argentina or the Italian North and South. An important feature of
the multiplicity of equilibria in our simple model is that they don’t depend on any
strong assumptions on either the agents’ or the inspectors’ preferences.
In our eﬀort to conﬁrm the multiplicity of equilibria also in the repeated game,
vii
we ﬁnd that inspectors might consider it proﬁtable to suﬀer negative payoﬀs in
the ﬁrst period of the game, in order to create more fuzziness as to how much
corruption there is in the economy, and thus decrease the probability of getting
caught, guaranteeing themselves bigger positive payoﬀs in their last period in the
game. Our result provides an alternative explanation to already existing literature
on the persistence of corruption. Unlike research that attributes persistence to the
perception of one’s environment as corrupt, or to group dynamics and reputation,
our simple model explains persistence as a self induced situation aiming to personal
gains, which in turn creates (positive and negative) externalities to the rest of the
actors in the economy, both agents and (other) inspectors.
viii
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Chapter 1
Corruption in All-Pay Auctions
1.1 Motivation and Literature
As mechanisms that involve an intermediary, auctions have been repeatedly used in
the literature for the study of corruption, since in the presence of an intermediary,
no mechanism is immune to it. In our study of corruption, we chose the sealed
bid All-Pay Auction as our main setting; as far as we know there is no literature
studying corruption in this setting. The basic strand of literature focuses on auc-
tions as procurement mechanisms and consequently uses the First Price Auction.
Nevertheless, we deem it important to study the eﬀects of corruption in All-Pay
Auctions for two reasons: they represent economic procedures-such as lobbying,
labour market tournaments, competition for market power- that are not immune
to corruption, and due to their modeling particularity can oﬀer insights that First
Price Auctions cannot.
Examples of corruption in labour market tournaments can be found in several
empirical papers; in most of them, corruption takes the form of favouritism, or
nepotism. For example Combes et al.(2008) using data from 1984 to 2003 ﬁnd that
network connections are more important than actual merits as determinants of suc-
cess at the ”concours d’agregation en sciences economiques”, the centralized hiring
procedure of economics professors in France. Although both publication records
and professional network were found to be statistically signiﬁcant determinants of
success in the french economics departments’ job market, the network eﬀect was
greater. On nepotism, Kramarz et al. (2007), using a Swedish population-wide
employer-employee data set, show that it is very common for highschool graduates
to work in the same plants as their parents (and especially their fathers); they
also show that ﬁrms hire more graduating workers when children of their existing
employees graduate, even if they have lower school grades, oﬀering them more job
stability and higher initial wages.
Although corruption and lobbying have always been faced in the literature as two
separate economic phenomena, most notably argued as being substitutes (see for
example Campos and Giovannoni (2008)), recent scandals of corrupt lobbyists im-
ply that lobbying is indeed not immune to corruption itself. In 2005, Jack Abramoﬀ,
a then top lobbyist for Greenberg Traurig law ﬁrm, was accused, and later con-
victed for oﬀering free meals up to 150.000 US dollars, plus 65.000 on his personal
tab at his restaurant ”Signatures” to republican congressmen he was lobbying to in
1
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2002-2003, while no present over 100 US dollars per year is allowed by any lobbyist
to any politician. According to New York Times (July 6th 2005), ”...In the restau-
rant’ s early months, a customer list noted who could dine for free...handwritten
notes next to 18 names - lawyers, lobbyists and eight current or former lawmak-
ers...”. Abramoﬀ, who was later caught overcharging the Native American Casino
Association, clients of his, on lobbying costs, up to 80 million, is not the only cor-
rupt lobbyist to be discovered by justice. In 2013, British Energy Policy MP Tim
Yeo was accused by the Sunday Times of ”tutoring” businesses how to lobby the
government at 7.000 pounds per day.
An interesting application on the All-Pay Auction can be found in Baye, Koveno-
ck and de Vries(1993), who ﬁnd that politicians seeking to maximize political rents,
are better oﬀ excluding the lobbyists with the highest valuations. When studying
corruption in auctions, recent literature focuses on speciﬁc types of corruption. For
example Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009) model favouritism, while Menezes
and Monteiro (2006) build a First Price auction where the auctioneer colludes with
the highest bidder, after observing bids.
In our paper, we not only consider these two types of corrupt auctioneers sepa-
rately, but also attempt a comparison between the two. We ﬁnd that the corrupt
auctioneer does not necessarily prefer to be one type or the other with probability
1, and depending on the dustribution of valuations might chose both with positive
probability.
When the auctioneer approaches the highest bidder after observing bids (a situation
which henceforth we will call posterior corruption), players bid more aggressively
than in the benchmark model without corruption1.We ﬁnd then that the revenue
maximizing auctioneer robs his collaborating bidder of all ”surplus” of corruption.
An interesting result of our paper that is particular to All-Pay auctions is that,
contrary to Second Price Auctions that are immune to corruption, in the merely
theoretical concept of a Second Price All-Pay Auction this is not the case. This
is due to the fact that in a Second Price All-Pay Auction players do not have a
dominant strategy to follow, thus corruption alters bidding behaviour and bidders
become more aggressive than without corruption.
Finally, we discuss the possibility that, within the setting of posterior corruption,
the second highest bidder is approached by the auctioneer. We ﬁnd that in an
auction with only two participants an equilibrium does not exist however, against
our original intuition, for N > 2 an equilibrium can exist.
This type of corruption where the auctioneer choses to collaborate with a bidder
after observing bids, has been studied by Menezes and Monteiro (2006), Lengwiler
1Analogous conditions for the First Price Auction can be found in Menezes and Monteiro (2006)
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and Wolfstetter (2010) and Celentani and Ganuza (2002) among others. While
Menezes and Monteiro investigate how corruption aﬀects the outcome of a ﬁrst-
price auction (bidding behavior, eﬃciency and the sellers expected revenue) and
argue that the auctioneer approaches only the winner to oﬀer the possibility of a
reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe, Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2010) argue
that the assumption that the auctioneer would ask for a bribe from the winner of
the auction is not the only choice, as it might be proﬁtable to ask for a bribe from
the second highest bidder, which would in turn create ineﬃciencies. Previous work
on the possibility of ineﬃcient outcomes was done by Burguet and Che (2004), who
study competitive procurement administered by a corrupt agent who is willing to
manipulate his evaluation of contract proposals in exchange for bribes. They ﬁnd
that if the agent is corrupt and has large manipulation power, bribery makes it
costly for the eﬃcient ﬁrm to secure a sure win, so in equilibrium it loses the con-
tract with positive probability.
The second type of corruption we focus on is favouritism. Unlike Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum (2009) that study favouritism in First Price Auctions, we built
an All-Pay auction and ﬁnd that in the presence of a favourite bidder, other bid-
ders become more or less aggressive given some conditions on the curvature of the
distribution of valuations; and as in the posterior corruption case, the revenue max-
imizing auctioneer will deprive his ”favourite” of all ”surplus” of corruption. One
of the ﬁrst papers to explore favouritism is Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), who study
favouritism in multidimensional auctions; they ﬁnd that it might appear when the
auctioneer assesses product quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the bench-
mark All-Pay Auction model without corruption. In Section 3 we study bidding
behaviour and the auctioneer’s maximization problem in Posterior corruption and
Favouritism. Section 4 is devoted to the auctioneer’s choice of corrupt environment.
We conclude in Section 5. Proofs can be found in Appendices A through D.
1.2 Benchmark Model: The All-Pay Auction
Our setting is one where the seller of an indivisible object wishes to sell it to one
of N buyers. The mechanism through which the winner is chosen, is a First Price
All-Pay Auction, where buyers place one-dimensional price bids; in the setting of
the all pay auction, the highest bidding agent wins the object, and all agents pay
their respective bids. The seller assigns the auction procedure to an agent of his,
henceforth called the auctioneer, which for simplicity, and without loss of generality
is assumed to gain a ﬂat wage, which we normalize to 0.
3
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We consider the incomplete information setting, where N risk neutral (payoﬀ max-
imizing) players place bids for the indivisible object; each player i’s valuation of the
object vi is private information, however it is common knowledge that valuations
are iid distributed over [v, v] with common distribution F . We assume that F has
full support and positive and continuous density f .
As a ﬁrst step, we discuss the agents’ bidding behaviour without corruption. Under
no corruption, the highest bidder wins the object,however all bidders have to pay
their respective bids; in case of a tie,we assume that one of the tying bidders is
randomly assigned the object.Thus,the payoﬀs for player i are:
πi =
⎧⎨
⎩
vi − bi , if bi > bj ∀j = i
-bi , if bi < bj for some j = i
vi
#{m:bm=bi} − bi , if bi = bm > bj∀i,m = j and ∀i = m
⎫⎬
⎭
We focus only in the symmetric equilibrium and strategies β increasing in val-
uations. We assume that β(v) = 0, since otherwise the bidder with the lowest
valuation would make losses with probability 12. Assume all players but player
i bid given the increasing strategy β(). Then, bidder i wins by placing bid b, if
b ≥ β(y1)∀j = i ⇒ y1 ≤ β−1(b), where y1 is the highest of the remaining N − 1
valuations, i.e. the highest order statistic of the N − 1 remaining values. Thus, i
maximizes his expected payoﬀ (we drop subscript i for simplicity) :
max
b
Π = vF (N−1)(β−1(b))− b
In a symmetric equilibrium b = β(v), and thus:
v(N − 1)F (v)(N−2)f(v)
β′(v)
= 1 ⇒ v(N − 1)F (v)(N−2)f(v) = β′(v)
Keeping in mind that β(v) = 0, the increasing symmetric bidding function is given
by:
β(v) = vF (N−1)(v)−
∫ v
0
F (N−1)(y) dy
The resulting symmetric bidding function is indeed increasing, with β(v) = 0 and
β(v) < v. Notice that because in an All-Pay Auction every player forfeits their
bid, bids are smaller than in an analogous First Price Auction.
2The condition can also be derived using the property of Revenue Equivalence
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1.3 The Model: Posterior Corruption and Favouritism
Always using an All-Pay Auction as our basic setting, we now look at two diﬀerent
types of corrupt auctioneers. First, we will consider the situation where the corrupt
auctioneer after observing the bids approaches the highest bidder and proposes a
bribe scheme, to be described later on. Second, we will study an environment
where the corrupt auctioneer has a favourite bidder to whom he wishes to allocate
the good before observing bids3. Henceforth we will refer to the ﬁrst situation as
Posterior Corruption and to the second situation as Favouritism.
1.3.1 Posterior Corruption
After observing bids, the auctioneer approaches the highest bidder, and proposes
to lower his bid to the second highest bid, thus securing him a win and lowering his
payment. In return, he asks for a bribe, proportional to the diﬀerence between the
highest and second highest bid; This ”surplus of corruption” is divided between the
auctioneer and the winner by the sharing parameter αpc ∈ [0, 1], which for now we
consider exogenous. Then, the maximization problem of bidder i bidding b when
all other bidders are playing given a symmetric increasing bidding function of their
valuation β() is:
max
b
Π = F (β−1(b))N−1[v − E[β(y1) | β(y1) ≤ b]−
α(b− E[β(y1) | β(y1) ≤ b]])− b[1− F (β−1(b))N−1]
As in the benchmark case, bidder i will win if his bid is higher than the highest of
everyone else’s bid, i.e. if b ≥ β(y1) ⇒ β−1(b) ≥ y1, a manipulation we are able to
do since by assumption β() is continuous and increasing and thus invertible. Fur-
thermore, y1 is the highest order statistic of N −1 valuations distributed according
to F (), and so its distribution is F ()N−1. Now with probability F (β−1(b))N−1
bidder i wins and has to pay the second highest bid to the seller, as well as a
proportion of the ”corruption surplus” to the corrupt auctioneer. In case he loses,
he has to pay his own bid b. Since player i cannot know the highest of N − 1 bids,
he calculates its expectation in case of a win:
E[β(y1) | β(y1) ≤ b] = 1
F (β−1(b))N−1
β−1(b)∫
v
β(y1)f(y1)(N − 1)F (y1)N−2 dy1
3For a similar application in the First Price Auction see for example Arozamena and Wein-
schelbaum (2009)
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The resulting ﬁrst order condition after imposing symmetry is:
β′pc(v) =
vf(v)(N − 1)F (v)N−2
1− (1− α)F (v)N−1
Integrating with initial condition β(v) = 0 yields the increasing symmetric bidding
function:
βpc(v) =
v∫
v
y1f(y1)(N − 1)F (y1)N−2
1− (1− α)F (y1)N−1 dy1
Setting ϕ′(y1) =
f(y1)(N−1)F (y1)N−2
1−(1−α)F (y1)N−1 we get:
βpc(v) = v
Log[1− (1− α)F (v)N−1]
α− 1 −
v∫
v
Log[1− (1− α)F (y1)N−1]
α− 1
Proposition 1 The limit of βpc(v) as α− > 1 is equal to β(v), the increasing sym-
metric equilibrium bidding function in the benchmark no corruption case. Also,
βPostC(v) at α = 0 is equal to βsp(v), the increasing symmetric equilibrium bidding
function in a Second Price All Pay auction, where the highest bidder wins the object
and pays the second highest bid, and all other bidders forfeit their bids.
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A1. Notice that since α ≤ 1,
and Log(x) is an increasing function of x, then
∂βpc(v)
∂α < 0 → βpc(v) decreasing
in α. Thus, with a corrupt auctioneer bidders become uniformly more aggressive
than without corruption, i.e. βpc(v) ≥ β(v); also, the less they have to bribe the
auctioneer, the higher their bids become.
After having obtained the bidding function for players, we turn to the auctioneer’s
point of view. Up until now we considered the sharing parameter αpc exogenous.
However, the auctioneer will chose the sharing parameter that maximizes his ex-
pected revenue.
Proposition 2 The auctioneer will set α∗pc = 1, leaving his collaborator indif-
ferent between accepting or rejecting the corrupt agreement.
The formal proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix A2. The auction-
eer’s expected revenue is nothing but the sum of the ex-ante expected payments
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of players towards him. As we saw before, bids are decreasing in αpc; however
the diﬀerence between the two highest bids is weakly increasing in αpc. Thus, the
auctioneer’s expected revenue4
ERpc = αN
∫ v
v
v(1− F (v))g(v)G(v)
1− (1− α)G(v) dv
is strictly increasing in αpc and as such, maximized at α
∗
pc = 1
Posterior Corruption in Second Price All-Pay Auctions
As has been discussed in several papers, the Second Price Auction is not aﬀected
by corruption. The underlying reason is that in this type of auction, players have
a dominant strategy-bidding their own valuation. However, this is not the case
in the context of a Second Price All-Pay Auction, where the highest bidder wins
the object and pays the second highest bid, and all other players forfeit their bids.
The maximization problem of an agent in a Second Price All-Pay Auction with a
corrupt auctioneer is5:
max
b
Π = F (β−1(b))N−1[v − (1− α)E[β(y2) | β(y1) ≤ b]−
αE[β(y1) | β(y1) ≤ b])− b[1− F (β−1(b))N−1]
Taking the ﬁrst order condition and imposing symmetry yields the following dif-
ferential equation:
β′spc(v)− β(v)(
f(v)(N − 1)(1− α)
1− F (v)N−1 )(F (v)
N−2 − (N − 2)f(v)F (v)N−3) = v(N − 1)F (v)
N−2f(v)
1− F (v)N−1
Without corruption, the analogous diﬀerential equation resulting from the maxi-
mization problem of agents is6:
β′sp(v) =
v(N − 1)F (v)N−2f(v)
1− F (v)N−1
4Where we substituted g() = (N − 1)f()F ()N−2 and G() = F ()N−1
5In this setting the corruption agreement between the auctioneer is the same as before, the
only diﬀerence being that the winner of the object that would normally pay the second highest
bid, will now pay the third highest bid.
6The proof can be found in Appendix A2
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Notice that the right hand sides of the two equations are equal. Thus, βsp(v) =
βspc(v) unless α = 1.
Proposition 3 Contrary to the Second Price Auction where bidders place bids,
the highest bidder wins and pays the second highest bid where corruption does not
aﬀect the symmetric bidding equilibrium (see for example Menezes and Monteiro
(2006)), in the Second Price All-Pay Auction, corruption alters players’ symmetric
bidding behaviour, making them uniformly more aggressive.
Posterior Corruption: Second Highest Bidder Approached by the Auc-
tioneer
In the previous parts of the paper, we looked only at situations where the highest
bidder is approached by the corrupt auctioneer. Now we consider the situation
where the auctioneer, after observing bids, approaches the second highest bidder;
his proposal is to match his bid to the highest bid, thus securing him a win, in
exchange for a proportional bribe. The bidder will accept only if his valuation is
high enough to be able to aﬀord the good and the bribe.
Proposition 4 In the All-Pay auction where the corrupt auctioneer after observ-
ing bids approaches the second highest bidder and proposes to match his bid to the
highest bid, thus securing him a win in exchange for a proportional bribe, for arbi-
trarily small sharing parameter α and N = 2, an increasing symmetric equilibrium
does not exist. For α > 0 and general N an increasing symmetric equilibrium can
exist.
In order to prove that an increasing symmetric equilibrium does not exist in All-Pay
auctions where the corrupt auctioneer approaches the second highest bidder, with
N = 2 and α = 0, we will look at the bidding decision of player 1 with valuation
v1 = v. Suppose that player 2 places a bid according to some increasing function
of his valuation β(v2). The expected payoﬀ for player 1 with strategy b = β(v) is:
Π(v, β(v)) = Prob(β(v) ≤ v2)(−β(v)) + (1− Prob(β(v) ≤ v2))(v − β(v))
The player with the highest valuation knows that by bidding according to β() his
bid will be the highest. Given that the auctioneer will approach the second bidder,
player 1 knows that he will be the eventual winner only if the second bidder’s
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valuation is not high enough. Thus his probability of winning is not equal to 1. If
instead player 1 chooses to bid b = 0, his expected payoﬀ is:
Π(v, 0) = v − E[β(v2) | v2 ≤ v] = v − E[β(v2]
Given that β() is increasing, notice that E[β(v2] ≤ β[v], and thus Π(v, 0) ≥
Π(v, β(v)). Then, for the player with the highest valuation it is not best response
to play according to the increasing bidding function used by the second player; we
can conclude that an increasing symmetric equilibrium does not exist.
The intuition behind this result is that in such an environment players are torn
between wishing to have the highest or second highest bid, as in both cases they
win with positive probability. The player with the highest valuation knows that
by placing β(v) he looses the object with positive probability; in a setting with
only 2 players however, he can chose b = 0 and win with probability 1, as he will
have placed the second highest bid, and can aﬀord to pay any bid b ∈ [v, v]. With
N > 2, choosing any bid b < β(v) would not guarantee him a win with probability
1, and thus an increasing symmetric β(v) might exist.
1.3.2 Favouritism
Now we will consider an All-Pay Auction where the auctioneer has a ”favourite”
bidder7 to whom he wishes to allocate the good, before observing bids. Before
the auction starts, the auctioneer and his favourite reach an agreement that the
former will reveal all bids to the later, and allow him to bid afterwards. In case
the favourite’s bid is a winning bid, the auctioneer asks for a compensation propor-
tional to the diﬀerence between the favourite’s valuation and his bid, with sharing
parameter αf ∈ [0, 1]. Since in an All-Pay Auction all bidders forfeit their bids,
the favourite bidder will then bid:
bf =
{
0 if vf < b
b otherwise
, where b is the highest of N −1 bids. In case his valuation is high enough to aﬀord
paying the highest of N−1 bids for the good, he will do so in order to win, whereas
if his valuation is not high enough he will bid 0 in order to minimize his costs.
We assume that the rest N − 1 bidders are aware of the presence of a favourite,
and we look at their bidding behaviour. The maximization problem of non-corrupt
7An example of favouritism in the literature is Arozamena and Weinschelbaum, who study the
welfare eﬀects of favouritism in a First Price Auction
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bidder i bidding b if all other non corrupt bidders play according to an increasing
function of their valuations, is:
max
b
Π = vF (β−1(b))N−2F (b)− b
In this setting player i knows that he is bidding against N−2 honest and 1 corrupt
player. Thus he knows that in order to win, his bid needs to be higher than
N − 2 bids and the favourite’s valuation. The resulting diﬀerential equation, after
imposing symmetry, is:
β′f (v) =
vf(v)(N − 2)F (v)N−3F (β(v))
1− vF (v)N−2f(β(v))
The above diﬀerential equation cannot be analytically solved unless we assume
a speciﬁc distribution of valuations. Nevertheless, although we cannot guarantee
uniqueness, in Appendix B we prove the existence and optimality of a symmetric
increasing bidding function solving the diﬀerential equation, under the condition
that f(v) decreasing in v. Given the existence of an increasing symmetric βf (v), we
are interested in comparing bidding behaviour in favouritism and the benchmark
model without corruption.
Proposition 5 If (β−1f (b))
′ > f(βf (v))f(v) then bidders bid uniformly less aggressively
than in the benchmark no corruption case. Analogously, if (β−1f (b))
′ < f(βf (v))f(v) then
bidders bid uniformly more aggressively than in the benchmark no corruption case.
More (less) aggression in our context means that βf (v) > (<)β(v), i.e. player i
with valuation v will place a higher (lower) bid in the presence of a favouritist
auctioneer than in an honest environment. An alternative view is that player i
will place the same bid in both settings, only if his valuation is lower (higher) in
favouritism than without corruption, i.e. if βf (v1) = β(v2) then v1 < (>)v2. The
proof of Proposition 5 can be found in Appendix C. The intuition behind this result
lies in the fact that non-corrupt bidders are driven by two diﬀerent forces. On one
hand, they know that with their valuation there are cases where they would have
won in the benchmark no corruption case, but now lose for sure; this eﬀect drives
them to bid less aggressively. However, they also know that if the valuation of the
corrupt bidder is not high enough given their own bid, they can win. This eﬀect
drives bidders to bid more aggressively. Ultimately it is the curvature of F () that
deﬁnes whether or not players place uniformly higher or lower bids than in the
benchmark model.
10
Chapter 1. Corruption in All-Pay Auctions
After having obtained the conditions for equilibrium and the properties of the
bidding function, we turn to the auctioneer’s point of view. As said before, if the
favourite’s valuation is high enough, he will set b and win the object. Now we know
that b = βf (y1), the bid of the player with the highest among N − 1 valuations. In
this case the auctioneer and his favourite share the ”surplus” of corruption which
is the diﬀerence between vf and βf (v), with sharing parameter αf ∈ [0, 1] Since
the auctioneer does not know his favourite’s valuation, his expected revenue will
be equal to the ex-ante payment of his favourite bidder towards him.
Proposition 6 The auctioneer will set α∗f = 1
The favourite’s expected payment to the auctioneer is:
p(v) = αfProb(v > βf (y1))(v − Eβf (y1)) | βf (y1) < v)
The ex-ante expected payment is:
E(p(V )) = αf [
v∫
v
[vFY 1(βf (v
−1))−
β−1f (v)∫
v
βf (y1)(FY 1(y1))
′ dy1]f(v) dv] = ERf
Since βf (v) is constant in αf then ERf is strictly increasing in αf and the auc-
tioneer’s revenue maximizing α∗f is equal to 1.
1.3.3 The Corrupt Auctioneer
Throughout the paper we have assumed that there exist two types of corrupt
auctioneers: one that strictly prefers posterior corruption, and one that strictly
prefers favouritism. In this section we drop this assumption and allow the auc-
tioneer to chose which type he prefers to be. We assume that bidders know that
they are facing an auctioneer that prefers posterior corruption with probability λ,
and favouritism with probability 1− λ. We assume that the auctioneer’s choice is
binding, and check how he will chose λ in order to maximize his expected revenue.
We will solve the game backwards, ﬁrst solving the bidder’s maximization problem,
taking into consideration our previous result that α∗pc = α∗f = 1.
For conveniece we will consider N = 2 without loss of generality, as our qualitative
results hold for any N . As before, players place their respective bids. Then, with
probability λ the highest bidder wins (and pays all the surplus of corruption to
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the auctioneer), and with probability 1−λ the auctioneer asks his favourite bidder
to rebid, after revealing his rival’s bid. In order to be able to obtain a symmetric
bidding function, we will assume that before placing bids, bidders do not know
whether with probability 1−λ they will be the favourite or not. Thus, they assign
probability 12 to both events.
Player i knows that with probability 12(1−λ) he will be able to rebid after observing
his rival’s bid, and thus will set:
bf =
{
0 if vi smaller than his rival’s bid
rival’s bid otherwise
As before,if vi is bigger than his rival’s bid, the auctioneer will take away all the sur-
plus of corruption from him. With probability λ player i is no longer the favourite,
and thus will chose b = argmaxEΠ(v). Then, the maximization problem of player
i is:
max
b
Π(v, b) = λ[vProb(b > β(y))− b] + 1
2
(1− λ)[vProb(b > y)− b]
Arranging the probabilities, the maximization problem becomes:
max
b
Π(v, b) = λ[vF (β−1(b) > y)− b] + 1
2
(1− λ)[vF (b)− b]
The symmetric ﬁrst order condition yields the diﬀerential equation:
β′(vh) =
2λvhf(vh)
1 + λ− (1− λ)vhf(β(vh))
As a convex combination of the diﬀerential equations discussed before, this has an
increasing solution. However notice that now f() need not be strictly decreasing.
Now, the auctioneer’s expected revenue is:
ER(λ) = λERpc(λ) + (1− λ)ERf (λ)
, where ERpc(λ) = 2
v∫
v
[1−F (y)]F (y)∂β(y,λ)∂y dy and ERf (λ) =
v∫
v
[1−F (β(y, λ))]F (y)∂β(y,λ)∂y dy
Thus:
ER(λ) =
v∫
v
F (y)
∂β(y, λ)
∂y
[2λ(1− F (y)) + (1− λ)(1− F (β(y, λ)))] dy
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Proposition 7 The auctioneer’s expected revenue is not necessarily monotonic in
λ. The curvature of the expected revenue depends on the curvature of the bidding
function and the pdf of valuations. For example, with uniform distribution on [0,1],
the expected revenue is a concave function of λ and maximized at interior λ.
The proof of Proposition 7 can be found in Appendix D. In Figure 1 we show
ER(λ) for vi ∼ Uniform[0, 1]; ER(λ) is concave and maximized at interior λ.
Figure 1.1: Auctioneer’s Expected Revenue as a function of λ (vi ∼ U [0, 1])
1.4 Conclusions and Future Work
Throughout the paper we tried to explore symmetric equilibrium bidding behaviour
and the auctioneer’s choices, in the setting of an All-Pay Auction where corruption
can occur. We considered two diﬀerent types of corruption schemes: one where the
corrupt auctioneer colludes with the winner of the auction, and one where the cor-
rupt auctioneer has a preferred bidder, whom he wishes to allocate the good to. We
found conditions under which players bid more or less aggressively in favouritism
that in the benchmark no corruption model, and showed that in posterior corrup-
tion bidders are always more aggressive.
Furthermore we argued that a Second Price All-Pay Auction is penetrable to cor-
ruption as, contrary to a Second Price Auction, the game is not dominance solvable.
Coming to the auctioneer’s choices, we found that in both corruption settings he
will deprive his colluding bidders of any ”surplus of corruption”. Finally, we saw
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that the auctioneer’s revenue is not necessarily monotonic in the probability that
he choses one type of corruption or the other.
What we did not talk about is the welfare eﬀects of corruption both on the bidders
and the seller; an interesting extension of our paper could give monitoring power to
the seller, and potential punishments to the auctioneer if caught ”cheating”, which
might lead to less/no corruption.
Appendix
Appendix A1
In order to prove that limα→1 βpc(v) = β(v), we only need to apply L’Hopital’s
rule. Since:
lim
α→1
Log[1− (1− α)F (v)N−1] = lim
α→1
α− 1 = 0
, and limα→1
∂Log[1−(1−α)F (v)N−1]
∂α
∂α−1
∂α
= F (v)N−1, then:
lim
α→1
βpc(v) = vF (v)
N−1 −
v∫
v
F (y1)
N−1 dy1 = β(v)
In order to conclude the proof of Proposition 1, we need to show that βpc(v, α =
0) = βsp. Thus, we need to solve for the increasing symmetric equilibrium bidding
function for the Second Price All Pay auction, where the highest bidder wins the
object and pays the second highest bid, and all other bidders pay their respective
bids. Revenue Equivalence implies:
[1−F (v)N−1]βsp(v)+
v∫
v
βsp(y1)f(y1)(N−1)F (y1)N−2 dy1 =
v∫
v
y1f(y1)(N−1)F (y1)N−2 dy1
Diﬀerentiating with respect to v, we get:
β′sp(v) =
vf(v)(N − 1)F (v)N−2
1− F (v)N−1 ⇒ βsp(v) =
v∫
v
y1f(y1)(N − 1)F (y1)N−2
1− F (y1)N−1 dy1
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Setting ϕ′(y1) =
f(y1)(N−1)F (y1)N−2
1−(1−α)F (y1)N−1 :
βsp(v) = v[−Log(1− F (v)N−1)]−
∫
vv − Log(1− F (y1)N−1) dy1
, and thus: βpc(v, α = 0) = βsp(v), which concludes our proof.
Appendix A2
In this Appendix we prove that the auctioneer’s expected revenue is strictly in-
creasing in αpc. We will begin our proof by computing player i’s expected payment
to the auctioneer. The expected payment is :
p(v) = αProb(win)(β(v)− E[β(y1) | y1 ≤ v]) ⇒
p(v) = α[G(v)
v∫
v
y1g(y1)
1− (1− α)G(y1) dy1 −
v∫
v
y1∫
v
yg(y)
1− (1− α)G(y) dyg(y1) dy1]
, where we substituted g() = (N−1)f()F ()N−2 and G() = F ()N−1. With a change
of variables we get:
p(v) = α
v∫
v
y1g(y1)G(y1)
1− (1− α)G(y1) dy1
Now, we can calculate the ex-ante expected payment to the auctioneer, ie player
i’s expected payment to the auctioneer before knowing his valuation vi:
E(p(V )) = α
v∫
v
v∫
v
y1(1− F (y1))g(y1)G(y1)
1− (1− α)G(y1) dy1f(v) dv
Again, with a change of variables, we have:
E(p(V )) = α
v∫
v
v(1− F (v)g(v)G(v)
1− (1− α)G(v) dv
The expected revenue of the auctioneer, is nothing but the sum of ex-ante expected
payments of bidders. Thus ERpc = N E(p(V )). The auctioneer wishes to maximize
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his expected revenue with respect to α. The derivative of ERpc with respect to α
is:
∂ERpc
∂α
= N
∫ v
v
v(1− F (v))g(v)G(v)
1− (1− α)G(v)
1−G(v)
1− (1− α)G(v) dv > 0
Since
∂ERpc
∂α > 0, ∀α ∈ [0, 1], the auctioneer maximizes his expected revenue by set-
ting α∗pc = 1. Then as we already saw, bidders will play according to the increasing
symmetric function without corruption.
Appendix B
To prove existence we follow Li and Tan(2000) .We wish to show that an increasing
solution to the diﬀerential equation
β′f (v) =
vf(v)(N − 2)F (v)N−3F (β(v))
1− vF (v)N−2f(β(v))
exists. With N = 2, the FOC becomes f(b) = 1v which has an increasing solution,
as long as f() is decreasing in its argument.
For N > 2, we are looking for an increasing solution βf (v) such that v ∈ [v, v],
βf (v) ∈ [0, v] and βf (v) ≤ v∀v, with the initial condition βf (v) = 0. Thus, our
domain is D = {v ∈ [v, v], b ∈ [0, v] : b ≤ v}. However, in this domain, both the
numerator and the denominator of our diﬀerential equation can be 0, so we need to
restrict our domain of existence of a solution, in order to be able to apply existence
theorems.
The numerator is zero for b = v, thus we need to exclude such b in order for
the numerator to be strictly positive. Also, the denominator can be 0 if 1 −
vF (v)N−2f(βf (v)) = 0. Let k(b, v) = 1 − vF (v)N−2f(b), and let b˜ be such that
k(b˜, v) = 0. Since f(b) decreasing, then k(b, v) increasing in b, and thus for any
b > b, n(b, v) > 0.
Our new domain is:
D′ = {b ∈ (0, v], v ∈ (v, v], bˆ < b ≤ v, bˆ =
{
b˜ if k(b˜) = 0 for b˜ ∈ (0, v)
0 otherwise
On the new domain the standard existence theorems apply. Then for any
(b0, v0) ∈ D′ there exists a unique solution βf0(v) in a neighbourhood of v0 such
that βf0(v0) = b0 and that solution is continuous in v0. The solution can be
extended to the left and right and then be deﬁned in a larger interval. Let (V0, V1)
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be the biggest open interval where the solution exists. Then, by the extensibility
theorem, when v approaches V1, (v, βf0(v)) approaches a point on the boundary of
D′.
We wish to show that limv→V1 βf0(v) = b˜. Suppose that limv→V1 βf0(v) = b˜. Then
k(V1,limv→V1 βf0(v)) = 0 and thus β′f0(v) can be made arbitrarily large. Since
there exists V1 such that as v approaches V1, βf (v) approaches b, then for any
 > 0, there exist δ > 0 such that if V1 − v < δ, | βf (v) − b |< . Since for
suﬃciently , β′f (v) is arbitrarily large, if v moves closer to V1 by a given distance,
| βf (v)− b |<  does not hold. Thus, limv→V1 βf0(v) = v. Then we have a strictly
increasing solution that takes values on the interval [v0, v] and we need to extend
it again such that it takes values on the whole interval of valuations [v, v].
Now we need to prove that the second order condition for optimality holds. In this
part of the proof we follow Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2001). The expected
payoﬀ of bidder i is:
Π(b) = vF (N−2)(β−1f (b))F (b)− b
Then:
Π′(b) = −1 + v[g(β−1f (b))
1
β′f (β
−1
f (b))
F (b) +G(β−1f (b))f(b)](a)
Also recall that the First Order Condition under symmetry is:
1 = v[g(v)
1
β′f (v)
F (βf (v)) +G(v)f(βf (v))](b)
Plugging (b) into (a) yields:
Π′b = v[g(β
−1
f (b))
1
β′f (β
−1
f (b))
F (b)+G(β−1f (b))f(b)−g(v)
1
β′f (v)
F (βf (v))+G(v)f(βf (v))]
Since all the above functions are increasing, when β−1f (b) < v⇒ π′b < 0, and when
β−1f (b) > v⇒ π′b > 0. Thus, it is optimal for bidder i to chose b = βf (v) such that
β−1f (b) = v, as there π
′
b = 0, which concludes our proof.
Appendix C
In order to prove that under some conditions, β(v) > (<)βf (v), we will follow
Arozamena and Weinschelbaum (2009), and prove that if for some b˜ ∈ [0, v],
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β−1(b˜) = β−1f (b˜) then (β
−1(b˜))′ > (<)(β−1f (b˜))
′ if (β−1f )
′ < (>) f(b˜)
f(β−1f (b˜))
. For conve-
nience we will set β−1f (b) = qf and β
−1(b) = q. Note here that since β(v) and βf (v)
do not appear in the diﬀerential equations without corruption and favouritism, a
particularity of the All-Pay Auction, in order to be able to compare them, for the
purpose of this proof we will use the equivalent diﬀerential equations:
q =
1
(N − 1)F (q)N−2q′
and
qf =
1
(N − 2)F (qf )N−3f(qf )F (b)q′f + F (qf )(N − 2)f(b)
Suppose that for some b˜ we have q(b˜) = qf (b˜). Then, from the above we have:
q′ =
(N − 2)F (b)
(N − 1)F (qf )q
′
f +
f(b)
(N − 1)f(qf )
We can see that if f(b)
f(qf )q
′
f
>
(N−1)F (qf )−(N−2)F (b)
F (qf )
then q′ > q′f . However notice
that since
(N−1)F (qf )−(N−2)F (b)
F (qf )
> 1 always, then f(b)
f(qf )q
′
f
>
(N−1)F (qf )−(N−2)F (b)
F (qf )
implies that f(b)
f(qf )q
′
f
> 1. Thus, we get that q′ > (<)q′f iﬀ q
′
f < (>)
f(b)
f(qf )
, i.e. players
bid more (less) aggressively in favouritism than in the case of no corruption.
In order to conclude our proof, we need to show that such b˜ does not exist, ie
if q′f < (>)
f(b)
f(qf )
, then q > (<)qf∀b ∈ [0, v]. We will focus on the case where
q′f <
f(b)
f(qf )
, as the proof for the opposite case is analogous.
Suppose towards a contradiction that for some b0 ∈ [0, b˜], q(b0) ≤ qf (b0). This
implies that
F (qf (b0))
F (q(b0))
> 1. Then it should be true that
∂
F (qf (b0))
F (q(b0))
∂b0
> 0. However:
∂
F (qf (b0))
F (q(b0))
∂b0
=
q′ff(qf )F (q)− q′F (qf )f(q)
F (q(b0))2
< 0
, since q′f <
f(b)
f(qf )
, f() is decreasing, F () is increasing, and q(b0) < qf (b0), which is
a contradiction.
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Appendix D
The derivative of the auctioneer’s expected revenue with respect to λ is:
∂ER(λ)
∂λ
=
a︷ ︸︸ ︷
2
v∫
v
[1− F (y)]F (y)[∂β(y, λ)
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
a’
+λ
∂2β(y, λ)
∂y∂λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
a”
] dy−
b︷ ︸︸ ︷
v∫
v
[1− F (β(y, λ))]F (y)∂β(y, λ)
∂y
dy+
(1− λ)
v∫
v
F (y)[(1− F (β(y, λ)))
c’︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2β(y, λ)
∂y∂λ
−
c”︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂F (β(y, λ))
∂λ
∂β(y, λ)
∂y
] dy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
Notice that b is strictly positive. Also notice that a is also strictly positive as long
as a”> 0. If instead a”< 0, then the sign of a is uncertain, and depends on the
relative magnitudes of a’ and a”. As for c, notice that its sign is also uncertain,
and depends on the signs of c’ and c”, and their relative magnitudes. Thus ER(λ)
might be increasing, decreasing or concave, depending on the curvature of F (v),
which concludes our proof.
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Bond Auctions and Financial Sec-
tor Liquidity Risk
With Gre´gory Claeys
2.1 Introduction
Liquidity risk is inherent to the very nature of the banking activity which is to
transform short term liabilities into long term assets. Traditionally, this was done
by collecting deposits in order to make loans for long term projects. However,
in the last two decades, this risk has been pretty much neglected by banks and
regulators alike. Banks around the world have been relying more and more on
short term wholesale funding such as the asset-backed commercial paper market,
the repo market and the overnight interbank market. The counterpart of this rapid
growth in wholesale funding was a parallel decrease of historically more stable1
retail deposits in the funding of the banks. A good – although a bit extreme –
example of this trend is the trajectory of the British bank Northern Rock in the
years leading to the ﬁnancial crisis, with its ratio of deposits to total liabilities
declining from 62.7% in 1997 to only 22.4% in 2006 (Bank of England, 2007b).
However, during the ﬁnancial turmoil that started in 2007 and worsened espe-
cially after Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008 – and described at length
in Brunnermeier (2009) – those crucial sources of short term funding for ﬁnancial
institutions all vanished at the same time. Consequently, banks relying on this
kind of funding had diﬃculties to meet their obligations and some of them actually
failed, meanwhile others like Northern Rock were nationalized to avoid bankruptcy,
highlighting the fact that liquidity risk had not disappeared.
Since then, there has been a renewed interest in the issue of liquidity risk in
the ﬁnancial sector. This is why the main purpose of this paper is to build a tool
for central banks and regulators to measure this risk in order to be able to assess
the fragility of their ﬁnancial sector. Note that the measuring tool described in
this paper has been constructed especially for the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh)
1At least since the implementation of deposit insurance in many countries to avoid the phe-
nomenon of bank runs that was prevalent during the ﬁnancial crises of the 1930s.
20
Chapter 2. Bond Auctions and Financial Sector Liquidity Risk
because of the availability of its very rich open market operations dataset to us,
but that it could be used by any other central bank conducting similar open market
operations.
Before explaining in detail how we intend to proceed, let’s give ﬁrst a careful
deﬁnition of liquidity risk because the word liquidity has often been used to describe
diﬀerent concepts, and we want to be clear about what we intend to understand
and measure in this paper. We deﬁne liquidity as the ability of an agent to settle
her obligations with immediacy. It is clearly a binary concept: an agent is liquid
or illiquid. On the contrary, liquidity risk is a continuous concept and we deﬁne
it as the probability to become unable to settle obligations over a speciﬁc horizon.
This is what we want to measure in this paper. Finally, it is also interesting to
distinguish, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), funding liquidity: the ease
to access funding (which is agent speciﬁc), from market liquidity: the ease to sell
an asset (which is asset speciﬁc), because in the paper we want to focus exclusively
on funding liquidity risk.
There exist already various measures of liquidity risk in the literature. Some of
them are based on data from balance-sheets of banks like the Liquidity Coverage
Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio introduced by Basel III after the subprime
crisis (BIS, 2013), other are market-based like the very simple LIBOR-OIS spread
or more complex like the composite ﬁnancial market liquidity indicator introduced
by the Bank of England (2007a). However, we consider that those measures of
liquidity risk are imperfect either because they depend heavily on stress scenarios
and are very sensitive to expert categorizations of assets and liabilities (in the case
of balance-sheet based indices) or because they do not allow to disentangle liquidity
risk from other risks like solvency risk (in the case of market-based indices). We
want to build a new tool to measure liquidity risk that will not be subject to those
ﬂaws. We think that, although it might be diﬃcult for central banks to assess the
liquidity risk of a speciﬁc bank or of the whole banking sector using data from
balance-sheets or ﬁnancial markets, we can still assume two things: ﬁrst, banks
are aware of their own liquidity risk and, second, they may be less willing to give
up their cash if this risk is high, to avoid bankruptcy. That is why the basic idea
behind this paper is to try to extract this information directly from the banks using
their bidding behavior in the bond auctions of the BCCh.
Why do we think that the banks’ bids in those auctions reveal their liquidity
risk? First, it is important to note that the BCCh sells bonds to the Chilean
commercial banks in order to drain money from the banking sector to control the
quantity of money in circulation in the economy and meet its inﬂation target. It
is purely a technical open market operation by the central bank and not at all a
way to ﬁnance itself or to ﬁnance the Chilean government. Therefore, those bonds
issued by the central bank bear absolutely no solvency risk whatsoever: the BCCh
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can always print pesos to reimburse the banks when the bonds mature. That is
why, in our opinion, the trade-oﬀ faced by a bank on whether to hold cash or bonds
depends only on the liquidity risk of the bank between the moment the bond is
bought and the moment it matures. Consequently, our paper could potentially
be of interest to any central bank conducting similar open market operations and
in need to evaluate in real time the evolution of the liquidity risk aﬀecting their
ﬁnancial sector in general, or their commercial banks individually.
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Figure 2.1: Spread between rate bids for ST Bonds and deposit rate vs LIBOR
OIS spread (in basis points)
Figure 1 is quite informative. This chart depicts the evolution of two diﬀer-
ent variables from 2002 to 2012. On one side, the red curve represents the famous
LIBOR-OIS spread2, which we consider an imperfect measure of liquidity risk but a
good ﬁrst approximation for the liquidity stress in international ﬁnancial markets.
On the other side, the blue curve represents the diﬀerence between the average
interest rate asked by Chilean commercial banks to buy the short-term bonds of
the BCCh and the deposit rate at the BCCh where banks can leave their reserves
2The LIBOR-OIS spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 3-month LIBOR rate at which
banks borrow unsecured funds from each other in the London wholesale money market and the
Overnight Indexed Swap which is roughly equivalent to an overnight rate rolled-over every day for
3 months.
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and have access to them whenever they want. At ﬁrst glance, it appears that there
is correlation between periods of international liquidity stress and an increase in
the premium asked by banks on those bonds, at least during the 2007-08 ﬁnancial
turmoil. This seems to conﬁrm our initial intuition that banks ask for a higher
liquidity premium on the BCCh bonds to give up their cash if they anticipate a
higher probability to face a liquidity problem.
In practice, how can we use those auctions to measure liquidity risk in the
ﬁnancial sector? The ﬁrst step is to build a simple model to understand, and
quantify, how the possibility of liquidity shock at the bank level aﬀects their bid-
ding strategies in a bond auction similar to the one conducted by the BCCh. In
terms of methodology, the idea is to combine the theoretical research in multi-unit
auctions initiated by Wilson (1979) with the literature on liquidity crises initiated
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). By itself, this would ﬁll a hole in the theoreti-
cal literature, as most of the articles discussing liquidity crises assume exogenous
(deterministic or stochastic) asset returns. On the contrary, the auction frame-
work will allow us to endogenize the interest rate and understand fully how it is
determined. The model will therefore contribute to both the ﬁnancial literature
and the auction theory by showing how the possibility of a liquidity shock aﬀects
bidders’ strategies and the auction outcome. To address these questions we develop
a 3-period model. In the ﬁrst period, there is an auction where a central bank sells
bonds that mature in the third period. Before the auction takes place, banks (the
buyers) discover their own private liquidity risk and the distribution of this risk
across bidders. In the second period, an idiosyncratic liquidity shock materializes
for some banks, which makes those holding bonds illiquid as their cash is invested
in the bonds. This allows us to obtain theoretical bidding strategies as a function
of the probability of having a liquidity shock. Intuitively, a bank with a higher
probability to get the liquidity shock should be inclined to ask for a higher rate to
insure itself against the shock if it is awarded some bonds in the auction. We de-
velop two versions of the model, one with no insurance against the liquidity shock
and another one with a Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort to see how
the bidding behavior of the banks is aﬀected by this policy.
The second step is to use the theoretical bidding strategies of the banks from
the model and the dataset containing all the details of the bond auctions conducted
by the BCCh between 2002 and 2012 to estimate the distribution of liquidity risk
across Chilean banks and its changes over time. To perform those estimations we
build on the literature on structural econometrics in auctions reviewed extensively
for instance in Paarsch and Hong (2006). Besides, once the parameters of the
distribution are estimated for each period, this method also allows us to retrieve-
for each bank participating in the auction-its probability to be hit by a liquidity
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shock during the duration of the bond just by inverting its bid thanks to the
theoretical bidding function obtained in the model. In the end, this helps us create
an interesting measuring tool for Central Banks conducting similar open market
operations and in need of evaluating in real time the evolution of the liquidity risk
aﬀecting their ﬁnancial sector in general or each of its banks more precisely.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how open market op-
erations in general and bond auctions in particular are conducted at the BCCh.
In this section we also describe our unique dataset collected with the help of the
BCCh containing all the open market operations details for a whole decade. Sec-
tion 3 presents the theoretical model of the auction in two diﬀerent settings. The
estimation of the distribution of liquidity risk in the Chilean ﬁnancial sector across
time is discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Open Market Operations at the Central Bank of
Chile
2.2.1 Liquidity Management Framework at the BCCh
Like many central banks around the World, the BCCh has adopted an inﬂation
targeting framework for its monetary policy. It started with a partial inﬂation
targeting framework in 1990 and moved to a full adoption, in combination with a
ﬂexible foreign exchange regime, in September 1999. To meet its inﬂation target,
the central bank uses the overnight nominal interest rate as its main policy instru-
ment. It sets a notional level for the monetary policy rate (MPR), and then adjusts
the quantity of money in the market to bring the overnight interbank interest rate
around that level. It also oﬀers permanent overnight deposit (FPD) and lending
facilities (FPL) to Chilean commercial banks with a view to keeping the interbank
lending rate close to the MPR. Like the Fed, the ECB or the Bank of England, the
BCCh can inject money via repo operations. However, unlike those central banks,
this is not the main tool for liquidity management3 in Chile. Indeed, because of
important capital inﬂows in the past and the constitution of large foreign exchange
reserves in the 1990s before the adoption of a fully ﬂexible foreign exchange rate
regime, the BCCh controls the quantity of money in the economy not by injecting
money every week in the ﬁnancial sector but by draining money from it. Thus, the
adjustment operations (like the repo operations) employed to inject money in the
3Note that in this subsection, the term liquidity is used not to deﬁne the ability for an agent to
settle her obligation as in the introduction or the rest of the article, but to deﬁne the management
by the central bank of the quantity of money in circulation in various markets or more generally
in the economy.
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ﬁnancial sector if necessary are used more sporadically and mainly for ﬁne-tuning.
The main operations of the BCCh are therefore the regular structural Open
Market Operations performed weekly or sometimes even bi-weekly to drain money
from the banking sector. Those operations take the form of auctions where the
BCCh issues diﬀerent types of bonds and sells them to commercial banks. These
bonds are short-term notes (PDBC) due in 30 to 360 days, nominal bonds with ma-
turities of 2, 5 and 10 years (BCP2, BCP5 and BCP10 respectively) and inﬂation-
indexed bonds with maturities of 5 and 10 years (BCU5 and BCU10).
Those various bonds can be purchased by agents authorized to participate in
the primary market. In practice, in 2012, the participants to these auctions in-
cluded twenty-three banks, four pension fund administrators, the unemployment
fund administrator, three insurance companies and four stock brokers.
Among the bonds sold by the BCCh, PDBC (the short term notes) are the
most heavily used to manage and regulate the quantity of money in circulation in
the ﬁnancial system within a given month or from one month to the next. The
auction schedule for these notes is announced monthly, when the Bank operations
calendar for the month is made public. The program planning takes into account
the liquidity demand forecast, maturing issues from previous periods, strategies for
complying with reserve requirements and seasonal factors aﬀecting liquidity in the
period.
The reader interested in more details in the liquidity management by the BCCh
should consult the document published by the central bank (2012) on this topic.
2.2.2 Bond Auction Format at the BCCh
To sell short term bonds (which are the one that will be of interest in the last
section of this paper), the BCCh carries out mainly multi-unit uniform auctions.
The auctions are multi-unit since a ﬁxed number of identical units of a homogenous
commodity (bonds) are sold, and uniform since all winners of the auction receive
the same interest rate on the bonds they buy, regardless of their actual bid.
In this type of auction, the BCCh reveals ﬁrst the volume of bonds it wants
to sell to the bidders. Then, each participant submits to the BCCh the minimum
rate at which they would accept to buy a given volume of PDBC. In the award
procedure, the BCCh ranks the bidders’ oﬀers by interest rate, ranking the bids
from the smallest to the highest rates and awarding bonds to the smallest until
the quantity being auctioned is totally allotted. The results are announced at the
close of the auction and all the banks awarded with bonds get the cut oﬀ rate (the
highest rate at which bonds have been awarded). The BCCh retains the option to
award a diﬀerent amount than scheduled, which in the case of bonds is +/– 20%
of the amount auctioned, or to declare unilaterally the auction as deserted because
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the rates asked by banks are too high. We have not noted any occurrence of such a
decision in our dataset; however we believe that it is a tool for the BCCh to cancel
an auction in case it suspects collusion between banks to obtain higher interest
rates.
2.2.3 Dataset of Open Market Operations (2002-2012)
Our dataset contains all the details of the open market operations of the BCCh
from September 2002 to august 2012. In particular, it consists of all the bidding
information, in every bond auction conducted by the BCCh during that period.
The information includes the total volume of bonds allotted by the central bank
in each auction, the marginal (or cut-oﬀ) rate and more importantly the bidders’
identities and the rates asked by each bidder. This dataset is not publicly available
and usually only the information on the total volume allotted and marginal rates
are available on the BCCh web site.
Year PDBC30 PDBC90 PDBC180 PDBC360 BCP2 BCP5 BCP10
2005 335 348 0 0 153 221 235
2006 569 560 0 0 57 86 37
2007 427 406 9 13 86 90 12
2008 534 315 133 133 217 213 113
2009 574 550 316 81 137 73 0
2010 751 279 112 127 228 261 0
2011 668 446 96 6 89 216 176
2012 500 175 35 0 123 178 150
Total 4392 3095 701 360 1090 1338 723
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics: Number of bond auctions per year
Table 1 and table 2 summarize respectively the descriptive statistics on the number
of auctions performed by the BCCh and on the marginal rates for all types of bonds
sold from 2005 to 2012.
2.3 Model of a Bond Auction with Liquidity Risk
Our modelling idea is to replicate the bond auctions performed by the Central
Bank of Chile in the Chilean banking sector as closely as possible.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics: marginal rates
2.3.1 The Basic Setup
There are 3 dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. There is an institution4 wanting to raise an amount
of money Q by selling a number Q of 2-period bonds at price p = 1 in an auction
in t = 0 . The money is then paid back with interest (determined in the auction)
to the bond buyers in t = 2.
There are N potential buyers of the bonds (i.e. banks) maximizing proﬁts. At
the beginning of t = 0, each bank i ∈ [1, N ] gathers one unit of cash at interest
rate r0 normalized to 0. After each bank has gathered its funds, the liquidity risk
of their funding is privately revealed to each of them. This risk is represented by pi
the probability for bank i to be subject to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock in t = 1.
This pi is a random variable independently drawn by each bank from a common
distribution F deﬁned on the interval [0, 1], with positive and continuous pdf f .
The auction in t=0
The auction taking place in t = 0 is a uniform multi-unit auction. First, the bond
seller announces the number Q of bonds it wants to sell. Second, the banks place
their bids. A bid consists of the minimum net interest rate ri at which the bank is
willing to accept to buy a bond. The bank proposing the smallest rate gets a bond,
then the bank proposing the second smallest rate gets the bond, then the third,
etc. until the total volume Q allotted by the bond seller is reached. The cut-oﬀ
4This institution can be interpreted as a Central Bank draining liquidity temporarily from the
banking sector (as it will be the case in the application in the next section).
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rate rs is the highest rate at which the supply of bonds Q is exhausted. A uniform
auction is deﬁned by the fact that all winning bidders receive the market clearing
cut oﬀ interest rate rs in t = 2. To say it diﬀerently, bank i is awarded 1 bond if
it bids ri  rs and 0 otherwise.
Finally, the banks which are not awarded any bonds in the auction invest their
cash in a risk free technology yielding an interest rate rL per period. This risk
free investment can be thought as the overnight deposit facility of the central bank
where the money can be withdrawn by the bank at any time (the rate rL would
be ﬁxed by the central bank) or it can simply be thought as cash with 0 interest
rate. Without loss of generality and in order to simplify the model’s notation, we
just assume rL = 0.
The liquidity shock in t=1
In t = 1, if the idiosyncratic liquidity shock does not materialize for bank i, the
bank’s creditors do not withdraw the cash from the bank in the intermediate period
and wait until t = 2 to take it back. If the idiosyncratic liquidity shock materializes,
bank i has to give back the cash to its creditors immediately in t = 1. However,
in this case, if the bank has invested in a bond, it has no cash left to ﬁnance the
withdrawal.
If there is no way to raise some cash in t = 1 we assume that the bank goes
bankrupt and makes a loss equivalent to the money it can not reimburse to its
creditors. In a second step, we also explore what changes if there exists a lender of
last resort policy where the bank can borrow from the central bank lending facility
at a ﬁxed high rate rH if it becomes illiquid in t = 1.
Collection of proﬁts in t=2
For the banks which have not suﬀered the liquidity shock in the intermediate period,
in t = 2, the banks collect their proﬁts rs from the maturing bonds if they have
some and reimburse their creditors.
2.3.2 Bidding Strategy of the Banks in the Bond Auction
Let’s say that the seller wants to sell Q = k+1 bonds in the auction. It means that
among the N potential buyers, k + 1 bidders are served: one is the cut-oﬀ bidder
who has proposed rs in the auction and k bidders have proposed rates smaller than
rs . We assume that N ≥ 2 and that k ∈ [0, N − 2] so that there is always at
least one bidder that gets nothing in the auction, otherwise all banks would have
an incentive to bid a rate equal to inﬁnity which would make the problem trivial
and uninteresting.
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The strategies available to the players are the rates they bid. Since we focus
on symmetric equilibria, we suppose that all banks use the same bidding strategy
β which is a function of their probability to get an idiosyncratic shock in t = 1.
Let’s determine this function β(pi).
The maximization problem of representative bank i bidding ri when all other
banks bid according to the symmetric increasing function β(pi) can be written as:
max
ri
Pr(ri < β(Yk)).[(1− pi)E(β(Yk)/β(Yk) > ri)− pi]
+Pr(β(Yk) < ri < β(Yk+1)).[(1− pi)ri − pi] (2.1)
+Pr(r1 > β(Yk+1)).0
where Yk is the k
th order statistic attached to the random variables pj sorted into
ascending order, for j ∈ [0, N − 1], i.e. the kth highest among the N − 1 random
variables.
The objective function maximized in equation (2.1) is easy to understand. The
ﬁrst line represents the expected proﬁts if the bid of bank i is smaller than the
cut oﬀ rate (i.e. the kth highest rate proposed, bank i excluded) and is therefore
awarded a bond in the auction: in this case, either the shock does not materialize
(with probability 1 − pi) and the bank makes a proﬁt equal to the expected cut
oﬀ rate given that this rate is higher than its bid, or the shock materializes (with
probability pi) and it makes a loss equal to 1. Similarly, the second line represents
the expected proﬁts if the bid of bank i is the cut oﬀ rate: in this case, either the
shock does not materialize and the bank makes a proﬁt equal to its bid, or the
shock does materializes and it makes a loss equal to 1 again. The third line is the
expected proﬁts if bank i is not awarded any bond in the auction. It is equal to 0
as the bank does not make any investment and is indiﬀerent between giving back
the money to its creditors in t = 1 or t = 2.
Since β is continuous and increasing in pi, the maximization problem can be
rewritten as:
max
ri
(1− Pr(Yk < β−1(ri))).[(1− pi)E(β(Yk)/Yk > β−1(ri))− pi]
+ Pr(Yk < β
−1(ri)) < Yk+1).[(1− pi)ri − pi]
where all the probabilities and conditional expectations are easily computable. Tak-
ing the ﬁrst order condition with respect to ri and imposing symmetry, such that
ri = β(pi), we obtain after some manipulations the following diﬀerential equation:
β′(pi) + β(pi)
(N − k − 1)f(pi)
1− F (pi) =
(N − k − 1)f(pi)
1− F (pi)
pi
1− pi (2.2)
Equation (2.2) is among the few diﬀerential equations that have closed-form
solutions. Following the method proposed by Boyce and Di Prima (1977), we can
obtain the following equilibrium-bidding function:
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β(pi) =
−1
(F (pi)− 1)N−k−1
1∫
pi
(F (p)− 1)N−k−1 p
1− pf(p)
N − k − 1
1− F (p) dp
which is indeed increasing in pi and such that limpi→1 β(pi) = +∞.
With pi distributed uniformly on [0, 1] the bidding function is depicted in ﬁgure 2.
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Figure 2.2: Bidding strategy with a uniform distribution, N = 8 and Q = 6
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. Because there is no other
way for them to insure themselves against the shock when they hold a bond,
banks compensate this risk by asking a higher rate on those bonds. The fact
that limpi→1 β(pi) = +∞ is understandable as the bank with pi = 1 is sure to have
the shock in t = 1 so it does not really want to buy the bond since it is sure to
make a loss if it does.
An interesting policy implication of the model for the moment is that we have
shown that an increase of the liquidity risk in the ﬁnancial sector (for instance
with a shift of its distribution towards a riskier one) can have a huge impact on
the rates asked by banks in a bond auction even if there isn’t any change in the
fundamentals of those bonds or any solvency problem whatsoever.
2.3.3 Introduction of a Lender of Last Resort in the Framework
Since the concept was introduced and developed by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot
(1873) in the 19th century, most central banks have been acting as lenders of last
30
Chapter 2. Bond Auctions and Financial Sector Liquidity Risk
resort in order to save illiquid but solvent banks from bankruptcy by allowing them
to borrow from the discount window whenever it seems necessary for the stability
of the ﬁnancial sector. Given the importance taken by this central bank function,
we thought it could be interesting to introduce it in our model in order to see its
impact on the strategies of the banks in the auction.
In our model, a lender of last resort policy can be represented by the fact
that a bank holding a bond subject to a liquidity shock in t = 1 can now borrow
from the discount window of the central bank to reimburse its creditors and avoid
bankruptcy. In this case, in t = 2, the bank collects its proﬁts from the bond but
it also has to repay its loan with an interest rate rH ﬁxed by the central bank.
Therefore, the maximization problem of bank i bidding rLi when every other bank
plays according to an increasing symmetric bidding function βL is:
max
rLi
Pr(rLi < βL(Yk)).[(1− pi)E(βL(Yk)/βL(Yk) > rLi ) + pi(E(βL(Yk)/βL(Yk) > rLi )− rH)]
+Pr(βL(Yk) < r
L
i < βL(Yk+1)).[(1− pi)rLi + pi(rLi − rH)]
+Pr(rLi > βL(Yk+1)).0 (2.3)
, where again Yk is the k
th order statistic attached to the random variables pj
sorted into ascending order for j ∈ [0, N − 1].
The main diﬀerence between objective functions (2.1) and (2.3) lays in in the
fact that, if bank i suﬀers a liquidity shock, it can avoid bankruptcy by borrowing
from the central bank which modiﬁes its expected proﬁts as it can keep the bond
until it matures. Since βL is continuous and increasing in pi , the maximization
problem becomes:
max
rLi
(1− Pr(Yk < β−1L (ri))).[E(βL(Yk)/βL(Yk) > rLi )− pirH ]
+ Pr(Yk < β
−1
L (ri)) < Yk+1).[r
L
i − pirH ]
where all the probabilities and conditional expectations are easily computable.
Taking the ﬁrst order condition with respect to rLi and imposing symmetry, such
that rLi = βL(pi), we obtain after some manipulations the following diﬀerential
equation:
β′L(pi) + βL(pi)
(N − k − 1)f(pi)
F (pi)− 1 = pirH
(N − k − 1)f(pi)
F (pi)− 1
Using the same method as before to solve the diﬀerential equation, we obtain
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the following equilibrium-bid function:
βL(pi) = pirH +
rH
(1− F (pi))N−k−1
1∫
pi
(1− F (p))N−k−1dp
which is increasing in pi and such that limpi→1 βL(pi) = rH .
With pi distributed uniformly the strategy is depicted in ﬁgure 3.
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Figure 2.3: Bidding strategy (in red), pi.rH(in green), N = 8 and Q = 6, rH = 2
As can be seen in ﬁgure 3, unlike the previous case, the rates are now bounded
by the rate rH charged by the central bank for its loan in t = 1. This makes
sense because even if it is costly to use the lending facility, the lender of last resort
provides an ex post insurance to the banks buying bonds. For instance, the bank
with probability one to get the shock is now indiﬀerent between getting the bond
in the auction at the rate rH and not getting the bond because in any case its
proﬁt is going to be 0.
In fact, this is an interesting side result in terms of policy implications, as it
shows that the introduction of a lender of last resort willing to lend cash to banks
suﬀering a liquidity shock can have a huge impact on the strategies of the bank
and on the result of a bond auction by bounding the rate with its lending rate.
However, although the LLR extension of the model is theoretically interesting,
we were unable to ﬁt it to our data, since rates bid during the crisis exceeded the
rate asked by the LLR. It is therefore not used in the following empirical part.
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One possible explanation is the fact that in reality banks are not completely
sure whether the central bank will intervene as an LLR and lend them money in
case of illiquidity or not. A possible extension left for future research would be to
introduce a non zero probability of the central bank not acting as a LLR in the
model. This probability perceived by the banks could also vary through time and
could be interesting to estimate.
2.4 Structural Analysis of the Bond Auctions of the
BCCh
The objective of this section is to use the theoretical bidding strategies of the
banks from the previous section in order to put some structure on the dataset
from BCCh bond auctions by estimating the parameters of the distribution of the
liquidity shock probabilities across the Chilean Banks and its changes over time.
2.4.1 Choice of the Distribution Form
In order to be able to perform this estimation, we need to assume that the distribu-
tion of the liquidity shock probabilities across banks takes a particular distribution
form. We have chosen the Kumaraswamy distribution (introduced by the author of
the same name in 1980), as it is characterized by several properties that are needed
in our analysis.
As described in Jones (2009), the Kumaraswamy distribution is deﬁned on [0, 1]
which perfectly suits our needs since we are interested in the distribution of a
probability. Second, it is particularly straightforward with only two parameters
a and b and has a very simple PDF: f(x; a, b) = abxa−1(1 − xa)b−1 and CDF:
F (x; a, b) = 1− (1− xa)b−1. Nonetheless, this density function is very ﬂexible and
can take various types of shapes (unimodal, uniantimodal, increasing, decreasing,
monotone or even constant depending on the values of the parameters5) as can be
seen in ﬁgure 4. That is why we believe that this distribution form does not impose
too much restriction on the data.
2.4.2 Data Selection
In terms of data, in order to estimate the liquidity risk distribution, we decided
to restrict ourselves to the observed bids from the 30-day bond (PDBC) auctions
5In that sense the Kumaraswamy distribution is quite similar to the Beta distribution but with
a simple explicit formula for its distribution function not involving any special functions
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Figure 2.4: The Kumaraswamy probability density function for diﬀerent parame-
ters
from 2002 to 2012 and put aside the other auctions of the BCCh. The main reason
behind this choice is simply the shorter maturity of those bonds, which makes them
a better substitute for cash or reserves at the central bank, their main diﬀerence
resulting from the expectation of a liquidity shock in the following month which
would suit perfectly our model. Another reason to use this auction is that we
believe that these short term bonds are more likely to be kept in the balance sheets
of banks (as it is assumed in our model) until they mature than the long term
bonds and not resold in a secondary market. Finally, given that they are really
short-term, we can also assume that there is no inﬂation premium asked as it would
be the case with longer maturity bonds.
More practical reasons on our choice of data include the fact that the 30-day
PDBC auctions are the most frequent open market operations of the BCCh as can
be seen in table 3 (with 4392 auctions performed between 2005 and 2012), while
at the same time being the auctions with the largest number of participants (for
more details, see the summary statistics of the PDBC auctions from 2002 to 2012
in table 3).
We have also decided to group auctions of the same month together to get
enough data per period of estimation. We know that this is a strong assumption
because it means that the liquidity risk distribution varies every month but is
constant in a given month. However, within the model framework it could simply
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Numbers of periods-months 118
Average Number of Bidders / period 48
Average Number of Winning Bidders / period 29
Average Rate Bid 3.62
Average Cut Oﬀ Rate 3.61
Average Standard deviation of bids / period 0.25
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for 30-day PDBC Auctions
be interpreted with banks drawing a new liquidity risk from the new distribution
at the beginning of each month.
Finally, instead of using the rate bids alone as done in the model, in the em-
pirical section of the paper we use the diﬀerence between the rate bids and the
deposit rate at the central bank at the time of the auction (remember that for the
sake of simplicity we assumed rL = 0 in the model). Indeed, we think that the
liquidity premium should be observed between those two variables and not between
the rate bids and simply cash earning 0% interest rate, because this spread takes
into account the variations in the monetary policy rate (the deposit facility follows
exactly the MPR with only minus 0.25 percentage point) inducing some volatility
in the bids not related to the evolution of the liquidity risk.
2.4.3 Estimation of the Liquidity Risk Distribution
In this section we perform a structural estimation of the parameters of the dis-
tribution for each period (each month) of our sample using our theoretical results
from the previous section. We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the
parameter vector θ = (a, b) according to equation 2.4.
max
a,b
N∏
i=1
Pr(pi = β
−1(bi, a, b)) (2.4)
Using the data previously described, we can estimate the parameters of the
distribution for each period of our sample. Figure 5 presents the estimated density
functions at various interesting points in time during the studied decade.
As can be seen in Figure 5, at the beginning of 2004 the density function has
a decreasing form and is deﬁnitely skewed to the right before becoming more and
more symmetric in 2005. Then, making a big jump in time, we can see that during
the worst months of the ﬁnancial turmoil in september and october 2008 after
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the density function deﬁnitely moved to the
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right revealing what appears to be a huge increase in liquidity risk in the Chilean
ﬁnancial sector.
In response to this risk and to the deterioration of international ﬁnancial mar-
kets, the BCCh decided to increase the quantity of money in the domestic ﬁnancial
system at the end of 2008 and 2009. They used part of their international reserves
and some swap agreements with the Fed to lend some U.S. dollars to the Chilean
commercial banks in need. Aside from that the BCCh, only for a strict six-month
period during the crisis, put in place regular repo operations aimed at injecting
pesos every week. To encourage participation in those repo operations they ex-
panded the eligible collaterals. At the beginning of 2009, the BCCh modiﬁed its
debt schedule by suspending the issue of ﬁve-year peso bonds (BCP5), ﬁve-year
and ten-year UF bonds (BCU5 and BCU10) in the primary market in order to re-
duce the usual money draining resulting from these open market operations6. All
these measures seem to have worked well and resulted in an enormous decrease in
the liquidity risk of the ﬁnancial sector, as can be seen in density function for May
2009. All in all, it seems that the evolution of the estimated distribution captures
well the main episodes of liquidity stress of the last decade in the Chilean banking
sector.
Besides the estimation of PDF of liquidity risk across banks for each period, we are
also able to infer the probability to be hit by a liquidity shock during the duration
of the bond for all the banks participating in the auction just by inverting their
bids thanks to our theoretical bidding function obtained in the previous section.
So, not only the method proposed in this paper provides to the central bank a way
to monitor the liquidity risk of its ﬁnancial sector as a whole but also to monitor
each of the Chilean commercial banks participating to its bond auctions7.
2.5 Conclusion
In the end, the paper proposes a ready-to-use tool for all central banks conducting
similar open market operations to the BCCh and in need of evaluating in real
time the evolution of the liquidity risk aﬀecting their ﬁnancial sector in general
or their commercial banks individually. To do that, we modeled the bond auction
6This gives us another reason not to use the auctions for those bonds to do our estimations:
these changes decided by the BCCh made those auctions unusable to monitor the liquidity risk
when they became an instrument of the central bank to reduce this liquidity risk.
7For conﬁdentiality reasons concerning the Chilean banks, it is impossible to show individual
results for any particular bank in the present paper. Given the small number of banks and the
structure of the banking sector in Chile, it would also be diﬃcult to show them with hidden
identities without making them easily recognizable.
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Figure 2.5: From left to right and top to bottom, estimated PDF for January, May
and August 2004, January and November 2005, September and October 2008, May
2009, August 2010.
conducted by the BCCh and used the theoretical results obtained to estimate the
parameters of the distribution of liquidity risk in the Chilean banking sector for
each month in the period 2002 to 2012.
In addition to this central goal, we believe that this paper also contributes to the
ﬁnancial literature as well as to the auction theory literature by proposing a simple
model of bidding behavior in a multi-unit auction where bidders are aﬀected by
liquidity risk. The model carefully explores the link between liquidity risk in the
ﬁnancial sector and bond rates. Although the model is designed in a very simple
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way because it was constructed mainly to be used in the structural estimation, it
also has some interesting policy implications. The comparison of our two diﬀerent
settings is particularly enlightening as it shows that the introduction of a central
bank acting as a lender of last resort willing to lend cash to banks suﬀering a
liquidity shock can have a huge impact on the bidding strategies of banks by caping
their rate with the lending rate it proposes at the discount window.
Finally, we think that it could be interesting to extend the analysis of the model
presented in this paper and to develop it further. A possible extension could be
for instance to replace the lender of last resort in the second period by a careful
modeling of a secondary market in which banks hit by the liquidity shock would be
able to sell the bond to banks that were not awarded bonds in the auction in t = 1
the initial period. The type of insurance provided by this secondary market would
depend on the market liquidity and therefore on which banks have been awarded
bonds in the auction and which banks will get the shock. Given that there is a
ﬁnite number of bidders, this feature would result in aggregate uncertainty in the
model. This could lead to a result analogous to the cash-in- the-market concept
developed in Allen and Gale (1994) where ﬁnancial institutions are forced to sell
assets in order to obtain liquidity, and because the supply and demand of liquidity
are inelastic in the short-run, a small degree of aggregate uncertainty could cause
large ﬂuctuations in asset prices. In this case, the rates asked by investors in the
auction may be distorted by their own liquidity risk but also by the aggregate un-
certainty coming from the secondary market. In any case, these features will surely
have some interesting implications on the bidding strategies of the banks. We leave
this possible extension for future research.
Appendix
In this appendix we prove that the increasing symmetric bidding function in the
LoLR case is a Nash Equilibrium. The proof for the no insurance case is analogous.
In order for the bidding function obtained (necessary condition) to be a Nash
Equilibrium, the second order (suﬃcient) condition needs to be satisﬁed. The
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maximization problem of bank i is:
maxriΠ =
∫
1
β−1(ri)β(p)
(N−1)!
(K−1)!(N−1−k)!f(p)F (p)
K−1(1− F (p)N−1−K)dp
−[1−∑N−1j=k (N−1j )(F (β−1(ri)))j(1− F (β−1(ri)))N−1−j ](pirh)
+ (N−1)!(N−1−K)!K!F (β
−1(ri))K(1− F (β−1(ri)))N−1−K(ri − pirh)
The derivative of the proﬁt with respect to ri is given by:
Πri = (ri − pirh) f(β
−1(ri))
β′(β−1(ri))
(N−1)!
(N−2−K)!K!F (β
−1(ri))K(1− F (β−1(ri)))N−2−K(2.5)
+ (N−1)!(N−1−K)!K!F (β
−1(ri))K(1− F (β−1(ri)))N−1−K
At the symmetric solution pi = β
−1(ri). Then when maximizing proﬁts the
ﬁrst order condition when imposing symmetry yields:
(N − 1)!
(N − 1−K)!K!F (β
−1(ri))K(1− F (β−1(ri)))N−1−K =(2.6)
(β−1(ri)rh − ri) f(β
−1(ri))
β′(β−1(ri))
(N − 1)!
(N − 2−K)!K!F (β
−1(ri))K(1− F (β−1(ri)))N−2−K
By substituting (2.6)into (2.5) we get:
Πri =
f(β−1(ri))
β′(β−1(ri))
(N − 1)!
(N − 2−K)!K!F (β
−1(ri))K(1−F (β−1(ri)))N−2−K(β−1(ri)rh−pirh)
Suppose all other banks are bidding according to the symmetric bidding func-
tion β(p). Also suppose that bank i decides not to play according to the symmetric
equilibrium, but instead chose some ri = β(pi) such that ri = β(q) with q = pi.
Then for any q′ such that q′ > pi we have Πri > 0, and accordingly for any q′′ such
that q′′ < pi we have Πri < 0. We have Πri = 0 only for q = pi i.e. when bank
i bids according to the symmetric bidding function. Thus, the symmetric bidding
function β(pi) is indeed an equilibrium.
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Strategic Complementarities and
Corruption
3.1 Motivation and Literature
The past forty years, policy makers and academics alike have shown deep inter-
est in understanding corruption, as countries of every sort- developing, transition
countries as well as major economies- have suﬀered corruption scandals. Most
economists accept that corruption can occur where rents exist, usually as a re-
sult of government regulation. Recent empirical research has focused on proving
the theoretical hypotheses on corruption using cross-country data. Since collecting
data on corruption is not an easy task most such data are country-level indices
based on ﬁrm and household surveys and expert assessments, the corruption per-
ception indices which are interpreted as measures of corruption experience. Such
indices are the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)1,
the corruption index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the
World Bank’s Control of Corruption index (WB)2. Despite the subjective nature
of the indices, many economists have used them, as the correlation between indices
produced by diﬀerent rating agencies is very high, suggesting that most observers
more or less agree on how corrupt countries seem to be.
On the presence of corruption in the economic system and its concequences, Mauro
(1995, 1996, 1998) argues that corruption is likely to occur where restrictions and
government intervention lead to the presence of excessive proﬁts or rents. Based
on Kraay and Van Rijckeghem (1995) and Haque and Sahay (1996) Mauro argues
that if civil servants are paid higher wages than similarly qualiﬁed private workers,
there would be less corruption in the economic environment. On the consequences
of corruption, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) go one step further, arguing that the
structure of government institutions and of the political process are very impor-
tant determinants of the level of corruption and that the illegality of corruption
and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than taxation.
An interesting phenomenon, also discussed in the literature on corruption, is that
otherwise similar countries (in terms of per capita GDP, geography, public sector
1Can be found for years 2001-2013 at: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
2Can be found at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspxhome
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wage structure, political history, even some cultural characteristics like language
or religion) or even regions within a country, can diﬀer greatly in the level of cor-
ruption in their economy.
Delmonte and Papagni (2007) perform a regional panel data analysis to study the
determinants of corruption in Italy during 1963-2001, using statistics on crimes
against the public administration at a regional level. Apart from determining the
corruption inducing factors in the Italian economy (including economic variables
and political and cultural inﬂuences), they research the diﬀerences of corruption
levels between the Italian North and South. They ﬁnd that indeed the levels of
corruption in the South and North of Italy are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, and claim
that these diﬀerences might be attributed to cultural diﬀerences, diﬀerences in the
modernization process, greater state intervention in the South as well as the degree
of competition of political parties in the two regions.
An interesting example of countries sharing similar characteristics but having big
corruption diﬀerences is the one of Chile and Argentina; despite their many com-
mon characteristics (comparable GDP per capita level, political history, language,
public sector wages, shared borders), their Perception Corruption Indices vary
greatly, with Argentina scoring 34 (high corruption) and Chile scoring 71 (low cor-
ruption)3 in 2013. Although the literature has not tried to address this interesting
phenomenon to our knowledge, Boruchowicz and Wagner (2011) discuss the cor-
ruption diﬀerences between the Chilean and Argentinean police forces and argue
that the longer and better training of the Chilean police, as well as it’s less strong
bonds with the national political elite are the main reasons behind these diﬀerences.
Although this paper focuses speciﬁcally on corruption in the police forces, as they
represent public administration we deem it important to be mentioned here.
Taking as given the above, and mainly the ”mystery” behind corruption diﬀer-
ences between similar countries/regions-which is very often attributed to cultural
reasons, as well as the fact that excessive rents can create corruption, we build a
model with multiplicity of equilibria as its main feature. Thus, we build a simple
model of procurement, in order to understand how economies with very common
characteristics can vary greatly in their level of corruption. In our simple model
where agents compete for a public good procurement by the government, man-
aged by a potentially corrupt inspector, we ﬁnd that multiple equilibria can arise,
and more interestingly ones without any corruption and ones with full corruption,
without imposing any assumptions or restrictions on either the agents’ or the in-
spectors’ preferences. Multiplicity of equilibria is a common feature of our paper
with some other research on corruption. Andvig and Moene (1990), ﬁnd multi-
plicity of equilibria in a dynamic model of corruption where both the agents and
3Results can be found at: http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/
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inspectors can propose/ask for bribes. However, the multiplicity of equilibria ob-
tained in their model is based on inspectors’ ”cost of corruption”, as they assume
that inspectors’ have diﬀerent costs when involved in a corrupt act. In fact, in
the extension where inspectors are identical the multiplicity of equilibria breaks
down: there is either full corruption or no corruption, depending on the model’s
parameters. In our model however, the multiplicity of equilibria, which is found
in both the one-shot and repeated game do not depend on any assumption on the
agents’ and inspectors’ preferences.
Multiplicity of equilibria, is a common characteristic with other work on corrup-
tion as well, although used to explain questions diﬀerent to ours; Emerson (2005)
presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government oﬃcials and indus-
trial ﬁrms, to show that corruption is antithetical to competition. Many equilibria
arise, where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low com-
petition, and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition.
However, Celentani and Ganuza (2001), derive diﬀerent results. In the context of
a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate a
project through an auction with two dimensional price-quality bids, while poten-
tial bidders have private information about their production costs, they ﬁnd that
it may be that corruption is higher in a more competitive environment.
In our model, the corruption monitoring power of the government depends on its
monitoring eﬀorts, however the higher the level of corruption in the economy, the
harder it is for the government to trace which individuals are in fact corrupt, and
subsequently punish them. This aﬀects the equilibria of our one shot game, however
it is more noticeable in the repeated game, as we ﬁnd that inspectors might prefer
to make loses in the initial period in order to increase the level of corruption in the
economy and make it easier for themselves to be corrupt and make higher positive
payoﬀs in the last period of the game. This can lead of course to persistence of
corruption in the repeated game. As explained in Paldam (2006), this persistence
is consistent with reality; using the Transparency International CPI, Paldam ﬁnds
that countries transitioning from high corruption to low corruption normally take
a couple of centuries to go through a corruption change of about 70%, with fast
transitions of the ”Asian type miracle” still taking half a century.
Theoretical explanations of this persistence phenomenon diﬀerent to ours have been
provided in the past; Sah (2005) attributes both big and persistent corruption dif-
ferences across similar countries to individuals’ perceptions of their environment. In
a dynamic model where bureaucrats and citizens interact, revising their (identical)
initial beliefs on the level of corruption in the economy, he ﬁnds that persistence
of corruption is due to individuals’ past experiences, aﬀecting their current and
future actions, which subsequently inﬂuence current and future realities. In Sah’s
model the reason of corruption persistence is the perception of one’s environment,
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whereas in ours it is the will to aﬀect one’s environment, to reach personal gains.
The idea that past corrupt behaviour might be used by an agent as a tool to enforce
present corrupt behaviour is also discussed in Tirole (1996), although within a very
diﬀerent context, the one of group reputation. The model treats group reputation
as an aggregate of individual reputations, where a member’s current incentives are
aﬀected by his past behavior and because his track record is observed only with
noise, by the group’s past behavior as well. Individual past behavior is imperfectly
observed and past behavior of the member’s group conditions the group’s current
behavior and therefore can be used to predict the member’s individual behavior.
The main results imply that the agents who were alive at the ﬁrst period of the
game have smeared their reputation, and thus have more incentives to engage in
corrupt activities than if they had always behaved honestly.
In our paper, corruption is punished if found out by the government, which exerts
eﬀort to uncover corrupt individuals. However, at least for now the government’s
monitoring eﬀort is considered exogenous, as we don’t deal with the government’s
maximization problem. On the relationship between corruption and punishment,
Di Tella Dal Bo E. and Dal Bo P. (2006), ﬁnd that punishment lowers the returns
from public oﬃce and reduces the incentives of high-ability citizens to enter public
life, and that cheaper threats and more resources subject to oﬃcial discretion are
associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
discussed the equilibria of the one-shot game. In Section 3 the repeated game is
presented. Section 4 concludes our results.
3.2 The Model
A government wishes to procure a public good, and assigns the procurement pro-
cedure to inspector k, whose payoﬀs we normalize to 0 without loss of generality.
There exist N agents in the economy, denoted by j = 1, ...N competing for the
project, and the worth of the project is exogenous and the same for everyone, de-
noted by Π.
The agents decide whether or not to oﬀer a bribe to the inspector, and the in-
spector decides whether to accept or not, after observing all oﬀers. The bribing
oﬀer is known only to the agent who proposes the bribe and the auctioneer. In
case of corruption, the inspector receives a fraction z of the worth of the project,
the remaining 1− z fraction going to the corrupt agent, who gets the project with
probability one. In case m ∈ 1, N agents oﬀer bribes, then they each win the
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project with probability 1m .
The government is aware of the possibility of corruption, and thus exerts eﬀort
X to discover it. The probability of ﬁnding out a corrupt activity Pr(·, X) is in-
creasing in X. For now, X is exogenous, and common knowledge to all players in
the economy. In case a corrupt couple is found out, both the corrupt agent and
the corrupt inspector, suﬀer punishment Ω, Ω exogenous, common knowledge and
measured in the same units as Π.
3.2.1 One-shot Game
First,we discuss the one shot game. For simplicity, and again without loss of
generality, we present here the case with one inspector and only two agents, hence
j = 1, 2.
In order to derive the payoﬀs of the agents, we need ﬁrst to specify two probability
functions: the probability of getting the project P (·), and the probability of getting
caught if corrupt Pr(·, X).
As mentioned before, in case only one agent oﬀers a bribe and it is accepted, they
win the project with probability 1. In case both oﬀer and it is accepted, they win
it with probability 12 each. In case no one oﬀers a bribe, they each get it with
probability γ < 12 , which can be interpreted as the agents’ talent, whereas if only
one oﬀers a bribe and it is not accepted, the one not oﬀering receives the project
with probability δ = 2γ < 1. In case both oﬀer a bribe and it is not accepted,
no one is assigned the project. Summing up, we deﬁne the probability function of
receiving the project P (Bj , B−j , Bk), where B is an indicator function and B = 0
when no bribe is oﬀered(agents)/accepted(inspector), and B = 1 when a bribe is
oﬀered (agents)/accepted (inspector). Thus:
⎧⎨
⎩
P (1, 1, 1) = 12 , P (1, 0, 1) = 1, P (0, 1, 1) = 0
P (0, 0, 1) = γ < 12 , P (1, 0, 0) = 0, P (1, 1, 0) = 0
P (0, 0, 0) = γ, P (0, 1, 0) = δ < 1
⎫⎬
⎭
The probability of getting caught will depend on the eﬀort of the government
X, the number of corrupt people in the economy, as well as the number of times an
individual has been corrupt (which in our one shot environment cannot be more
than one). Thus, the probability function of getting caught is Pri(Mi,M,X), where
Mi = 0, 1 is the number of times an individual has been corrupt, and M ∈ [0, 3] is
the sum of corrupt individuals in the economy.
The probability of getting caught is zero if the individual has not been corrupt,
is increasing in the number of times one has been corrupt, and decreasing in the
volume of corruption in the economy, i.e.: Pri(0,M,X) = 0 ∀M ∈ [0, 3] and X,
∂Pri(Mi,M,X)
∂Mi
> 0, and ∂Pri(Mi,M,X)∂M < 0.
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The actions available to agents are {Bj = 0, Bj = 1}, and the actions available to
the inspector are {Bk = 0, Bk = 1}.
Proposition 1: The one shot game has multiple equilibria, some of which in dom-
inant strategies.
We here solve the one shot game in order to prove Proposition 1. As discussed
before, ﬁrst the agents decide whether to oﬀer a bribe or not, and then the inspec-
tor decides whether to accept or not; thus we will solve the game by backwards
induction.
The payoﬀs for the inspector are:
πk =
{
zΠ− ΩPri(Mi,M,X) if he accepts a bribe if it is oﬀered
0 otherwise
It is apparent that the action chosen by the inspector will depend on the relative
magnitudes of the probability of getting caught and the sharing parameter z, and
thus we can distinguish three diﬀerent cases for the inspector:
Bk =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if zΠ− Pr(1, 2, X)Ω > 0 (Case 1)
1 if zΠ− Pr(1, 2, X)Ω < 0 and zΠ− Pr(1, 3, X)Ω > 0 (Case 2) and both agents bribe
0 if zΠ− Pr(1, 2, X)Ω < 0 and zΠ− Pr(1, 3, X)Ω > 0 and not both agents bribe
0 if zΠ− Pr(1, 3, X)Ω < 0 (Case 3)
Thus the inspector always accepts a bribe if the probability of punishment for cor-
ruption is very low, even with few corrupt individuals in the economy, accepts a
bribe only if both agents propose it if the punishment probability is relatively high
with few corrupt individuals in the economy, and never accepts it if the probability
of being caught is very high, even if there are two many corrupt individuals in the
economy.
Now turning to the agents, their payoﬀs are:
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πj =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2(1− z)Π− ΩPr(1, 3, X), if both bribe and k accepts
(1− z)Π− ΩPr(1, 2, X), if only j bribes and k accepts
0, if only −j bribes and k accepts
γΠ, if no one bribes
0, if either both or only j bribe and k does not accept
δΠ, if only −j bribes and k does not accept
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Let us state the following conditions:
Condition1: 12(1− z)Π− ΩPr(1, 3, X) > 0
Condition2: (1− z)Π− ΩPr(1, 2, X) > γΠ
Condition3: 12(1− z)Π− ΩPr(1, 3, X) > δΠ
Then, we have the following equilibria:
When in Case 1, the Inspector always accepts. Then, If Conditions 1 and 2 hold,
there exists a dominant strategy for the agents which is to bribe, and each agent
gets the project with probability 12 . If conditions 1 and 2 do not hold, it’s a domi-
nant strategy not to bribe, and each agent gets the project with probability γ. If
condition 1 holds but 2 not, there exist two Nash Equilibria: (B1 = 1, B2 = 1)
where both agents get the project with probability 12 , and (B1 = 0, B2 = 0) where
both get it with probability γ. If condition 1 doesn’t hold but 2 does, we have
again two NE: (B1 = 1, B2 = 0) where 1 gets it with probability 1 and 2 gets it
with probability 0, and (B1 = 0, B2 = 1), where 1 gets it with probability 0 and 2
gets it with probability 1.
When in Case 2, the Inspector accepts only if both agents bribe. If condition 3
holds, there exist two NE: (B1 = 1, B2 = 1) where both agents get the project
with probability 12 , and (B1 = 0, B2 = 0) where both get it with probability γ. If
condition 3 doesn’t hold, there exists a dominant strategy which is not to bribe,
and each agent gets the project with probability γ.
When in Case 3, the equilibrium is unique: no one oﬀers a bribe and each agent
gets the project with probability γ.
As can be observed, even the simple one-shot game has multiple equilibria; es-
pecially interesting to us is the multiplicity of equilibria in Cases 1 and 2, as there
the economy can end up being fully corrupt, or not corrupt at all, while the condi-
tions that regulate corruption are exactly the same. Notice that multiple equilibria
arise when the government’s monitoring eﬀorts are mild; when instead they are
very strong corruption disappears, whereas when they are very low, the economy
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becomes very corrupt.
It is also interesting to notice that in our one-shot game, multiplicity of equilibria
does not require any assumptions on the preferences of either the agents or the
inspector.
3.3 Repeated Game
We now consider an environment, where in every period one inspector and two
agents are born, all living two periods each, such that every period the economy is
populated by one old inspector and two old agents, one young inspector and two
young agents. As before, the inspectors know which agents bribe them, as well
as which ones have bribed them in the past; the agents only know their own past
and present actions and their inspectors response to them. The probabilities of the
agents getting the object are then the same as in the one shot game.
However, the probabilities of getting caught now change; more speciﬁcally in a
game with two periods only, the potential values for Mi and M change, and now
we have: Pri(Mi,M,X), where Mi ∈ [0, 2] is the number of times an individual
has been corrupt, and M ∈ [0, 9] is the sum of corrupt instances in the economy
(corrupt cases from the ﬁrst period can also be discovered in the second period
of the game). The probabilities of getting caught, retain the three properties de-
scribed before, and also have a non-correlation property:
Pri(2,M,X) = Pri(1,M,X)Pr(1,M,X) + 2Pri(1,M,X)(1 − Pri(1,M,X)) =
1− (1− Pri(1,M,X))(1− Pri(1,M,X)) < 2Pri(1,M,X)
i.e. the events of getting caught being corrupt in diﬀerent time periods are un-
correlated. This property garrantees that being corrupt in the ﬁrst period of the
game increases your likelihood to bribe (or accept a bribe) in the second.
Concluding, the probability of getting caught is decreasing in corruption in the
overall economy and is underproportionally increasing in the own amount of cor-
ruption.
3.3.1 The equilibria
The inspectors have again a 0 or 1 decision. They have information on the bribes
proposed to them by the agents and, if they are ”old”, some further information
on last period. In particular, they know whether or not they were corrupt last pe-
riod and, depending on the assumption whether or not they observe the age of the
agent they are communicating with, some information of how corrupt the previous
period’s agents are. We will continue using the assumption that inspectors know
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the ”age” of the agents’ they are communicating with. Thus, the most information
is held by old inspectors, and the least information is held by young agents.
Proposition 2: Inspectors might be willing to suﬀer negative payoﬀs in their ﬁrst
period in the game, in order to guarantee themselves greater positive payoﬀs in the
second period.
In order to understand Proposition 2, let us look at the inspectors’ problem. In-
spectors have to decide whether or not to accept a bribe if oﬀered. An old agent’s
present action depends on his last period’s action, and the amount of overall cor-
ruption. In particular, if having bribed last period, the question is whether or
not
zΠ− Ω
9∑
M=0
Probok(M)Pr(2,M,X) > −Ω
6∑
M=0
Probok(M)Pr(1,M,X).
, since we have assumed that an individual can be caught if being corrupt in any
period of the game. We also assume that punishment Ω is the same no matter
how many times one has been caught being corrupt, for simplicity and without
loss of generality. In words, the question is whether the gain from bribing in his
second period is greater than the additional probability of getting caught times the
price to be paid, and Probok(M) is the subjective probability that an old inspector
assigns to the event that there exist M corruption cases in the overall economy.
For old inspectors that were not corrupt, the analogous equation is:
zΠ− Ω
9∑
M=0
Probok(M)Pr(1,M,X) > 0
Now, let us consider young inspectors; they want to maximize life-time pay-oﬀs.
In case a young inspector does not accept any bribe he earns zero payoﬀ. Consider
now a particular case:
zΠ− Ω
9∑
M=0
Probyk(M)Pr(1,M,X) < −Ω
6∑
M=0
Probyk(M)Pr(0,M,X) = 0,
, where Probyk(M) is the subjective probability that the young inspector assigns
to the event that M corruption cases exist in the economy. However,
zΠ− Ω
9∑
M=0
Probyk(M)Pr(1,M,X) > −Ω
6∑
M=0
Probyk(M)Pr(0,M,X)− 
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It is apparent, that it can well be that
zΠ− Ω
9∑
M=0
Probok(M)Pr(2,M,X) > −Ω
6∑
M=0
Probok(M)Pr(1,M,X) + 
In that case, even though the inspector is making loses when young, he is oﬀsetting
this by greater positive payoﬀs in his second period of the game. The intuition
behind our result is that the inspector might be willing to accept a bribe risking
to be caught and suﬀer losses in the ﬁrst period, in order to increase the level of
corruption in the economy-thus decreasing the probability that he will be caught
next period, if this can guarantee him positive two-period payoﬀs.
Our result provides an alternative explanation to already existing literature on
the persistence of corruption. Unlike research that attributes persistence to the
perception of one’s environment as corrupt, or to group dynamics and reputation,
our simple model explains persistence as a self induced situation aiming to personal
gains, which in turn creates (positive and negative) externalities to the rest of the
actors in the economy, both agents and (other) inspectors.
3.4 Conclusions and Future Work
Within the context of an environment where agents compete against each other for
the acquisition of a public good procurement project, assigned by the government
and handled by a possibly corrupt inspector, we ﬁnd that there exists multiplicity
of equilibria, and in speciﬁc both ”good” equilibria without corruption, and ”bad”
equilibria where corruption arises. The multiplicity of equilibria arising in our
simple one-shot model is very useful for us to interpret why countries that are quite
similar in all other characteristics, can diﬀer a lot in the level of corruption in their
economy, like Chile and Argentina or the Italian North and South. An important
feature of the multiplicity of equilibria in our model is that they don’t depend on
any strong assumptions on either the agents’ or the inspectors’ preferences.
In our eﬀort to conﬁrm the multiplicity of equilibria also in the repeated game,
we ﬁnd that inspectors might consider it proﬁtable to suﬀer negative payoﬀs in
the ﬁrst period of the game, in order to create more fuzziness as to how much
corruption there is in the economy, and thus decrease the probability of getting
caught, guaranteeing themselves bigger positive payoﬀs in their last period in the
game. Our result provides an alternative explanation to already existing literature
on the persistence of corruption. Unlike research that attributes persistence to the
perception of one’s environment as corrupt, or to group dynamics and reputation,
our simple model explains persistence as a self induced situation aiming to personal
gains, which in turn creates (positive and negative) externalities to the rest of the
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actors in the economy, both agents and (other) inspectors.
A possibly interesting extension of the model would be its expansion to T time
periods,K inspectors and J agents. Endogenizing the government monitoring eﬀort
X and solving the government’s maximization problem could lead to interesting
implications on the level of corruption in the economy and possibly rule out some
of the equilibria we found both in the one-shot and the repeated game.
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